The War on Uyghurs

A chapter from a book that argues that Uyghurs were indeed a terror threat blabla: The Xinjiang Issue and Washington’s China Strategy https://sci-hub.se/10.1007/978-3-319-54888-3_6

TWoU.Introduction

Introduction

• A network of surveillance, indoctrination and internment is serving to destroy Uyghur identity by:
  • breaking linkages of social capital
  • discouraging Uyghur language use
  • dismantling any aspects of Uyghur cultural practices the state deems threatening.

Who are the Uyghurs?

• Uyghur definition
  • Uyghurs are mostly Muslim people speaking a Turkic language.
    • Language is intelligible to Uzbeks, who are also more settled.
  • They inhabit the northwest region of china known as XUAR or Eastern Turkestan.
    • Here, around 11 million Uyghurs live.
    • An additional 0.5 million live around the world, particularly many in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey.
  • Culturally, they share more with Central Asia than Han.
  • They are more settled compared ot the nomadic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Turkmen.

What is terrorism?

Transclude of What-is-Terrorism

The Dehumanization of Being Branded a Terrorist

• The GWOT quickly dehumanized ‘terrorists’.
  • [e_c] Because of the new type of warfare against an amorphous and irrational threat instead of state enemy.
    • [r_e] Thus the US assumed the rules of state-to-state conflict do not apply.

---

• Being labeled a terrorist is devastating and dehumanizing.
  • [ s ] Because the enemies of the GWOT are characterized as an irrational existential threat.
    • It immediately brands a population as a biological threat to the entirety of the global system, deserving complete obliteration to ensure the health of society.
      • This is described in Foucault’s concept of biopolitics.
    • By framing them as a threat as opposed to a foe, it strips them of any political aims or history of oppression. Rather, like a cancer, they are imagined as merely irrational purveyors of death and destruction.
      • This was most apparent in the extra-judicial internment of suspected terrorists at Guantanamo Bay. Quarantined indefinitely without the status of either ‘prisoner of war’ or ‘criminal,’ outside the protection of the law.
  • [ s ] Because the enemies of the GWOT are culturally profiled.
    • [e_m] The threat they pose is seen as coming from an “extremist” strain of Islam.

Structure of the Book

• Ch 1. Uyghur relations with china from 1759-2001
• Ch 2. GWOT and its impact on the Uyghurs’ relationship to China
• Ch 3. Why the terrorist threat up to 2013 was almost non-existent.
• Ch 4-6: Developments in Xinjiang since 2001
  • Ch 4. Very few Uyghur-led “terrorist attacks” took place in Xinjiang from 2001-2011.
  • Ch 5. Covering 2013-2016, explains how China’s suppression of dissent led to a self-fulfilling prophecy of Uyghur militancy.
  • Ch 6. How the events from 2013-2016 laid the foundations for the cultural genocide campaign that began in 2017.

Link to original

TWoU.Ch1.Colonialism, 1759–2001

Previous: TWoU.Introduction

Ch 1 Colonialism, 1759–2001

Qing Conquest and Rule: How the Uyghurs and Their Homeland Became Part of Modern China

• The PRC claim that Xinjiang has been part of China since ancient times is false.
  • [ s ] It had a history of interaction with empires from China but also from Central Asia and has been the center of its own empires.
  • [ s ] Only became part of larger China when the Qing Dynasty conquered it in the 1750s.
  • [ s ] Only became integrated into larger Chinese territorial polity in late 1800s when Qing made it province of its domain.
  • [e_m] They say this because the Qing empire was the first owner of the Uyghur homeland that would become a modern state.

Qing Conquest and Early Rule: Continuity with the past

• In the 1750s, the Qing empire conquered Xinjang from the Zunghar Khanate.
  • [ q ] They adopted many of the Zunghar’s way of ruling.
    • [ s ] Set up the imperial outpost close to the Zunghar’s capital.
    • [ s ] Resettled many Muslims from the Tarim Basin to build and feed their outpost.
    • [ s ] Adopted same indirected system of rule, relying on the Muslims’ own Bäg system.
• During its first century of rule, the Qing did not make Xinjiang into a physical colony of the empire.
  • [ s ] The number of representatives from Qing remained small
    • [ q ] They only maintained outposts manned by mostly Manchu and Mongols.
    • [r_e] That’s why Rian Thum refered to the status at this time as a “dependency governed by a Manchu-dominated military’“.
  • [ s ] In 1820s, The imperial court contemplated whether to keep investing in controlling the Tarim Basin at all.
    • [r_e] In 1860s when Muslim rebellions broke out, Qing did not put much energy into suppressing them and eventually withdrew.
• The 1860s revolts were not really part of Uyghur national liberation struggles.
  • [ s ] The revolts were multinational.
    • [ s ] The largest state to develop out of it was led by Yakub Beg, from the Ferghana Valley (Uzbekistan).
  • [ s ] There was no concept of a modern Uyghur nation.
    • [ s ] Local populations identified with multiple allegiances (Muslim, settled or nomadic, and Turkic)
• After the Qing withdrew, Yakub Beg wanted to establish a unified state in the region.
  • [ q ] But there was an independent para-state in the north, the Ili Sultanate.
• In return, Russians conquered the Ili Sultanate.
  • [e_m] They feared a power vacuum and were worried about Yakub Beg’s growing power.
  • [ q ] They only ruled for a decade.
  • [ q ] They claimed they were only maintaining control until Qing returned.
    • [ q ] Yet their policies were more like colonialism than even Qing.
• The Qing returned conquest in the north in 1876, after heavy debates.
• By 1880 they reconquered the region except Ili valley.
• In 1881, Russia returned most of its territory to the Qing.
• Majority of the local Muslims in the north and resettled in the Russian part of the Ili valley (now part of Kazakhstan).
  • [r_e] Created Uyghur population on the border with China, that would become influential in the modern period.

Late Qing Colonialism and the creation of Xinjiang

• After retaking the region in 1881, it was made into a provice titled Xinjiang (New Territory).
  • [ q ] This name was already used informally by the Qing.
• Qing was evolving into Han-dominated Chinese nation-state.
  • [r_e] The Bäg system was almost entirely eradicated and replaced with a network of territories with Han administrators.
• The Qing started policies to assimilate the population.
  • [e_c] Establishing educational network in Mandarin and teaching Confucian thought.
• Thus in the last years of the Qing Empire, its administration of Xinjiang appeared much more like colonialism.
  • [ s ] Indirect rule was replaced with invasive administrators from the colonial metropole.
  • [ s ] Attempts were made to assimilate the locals into Han culture.
• Yet it was more frontier colony than settler collony.
  • [ s ] The locals continued to live their lives like before.

Republican China in Xinjiang and the Rise of Modern Uyghur Nationalism

• The fall of Qing was not a transition from empire to nation-state, but to a new concept of ‘national empire’, like Tsarist Russia ⇒ USSR.
  • [e_c] There was little revolutionary zeal around the fall of the Qing Empire like for other empires around the world.
    • [ s ] It was not anti-colonial, because it was driven by the dominant Han ethnic group.
    • [ s ] It was not inspired by disenfranchised citizens like in Russia.
    • [ s ] Republican China inherited the territory of the Qing Empire.

Early Republican Rule’s Continuity with Qing Rule and the Birth of Modern Uyghur Nationalism

• First Han administrator after the Xinhai Revolution was Yang Zengxin, who ruled in 1911-1928.
  • He only wanted to maintain control over a frontier region, but didn’t make an effort to integrate the region into the new Republic of China.
    • This involved being aware of potential revolts.
• The formation of Uyghur nationalism gained momentum due to the Bolshevik revolution and Muslims who went to Russia in 1881 who wanted nationality within the Soviet Union.
• Before the 1920s, there was a sense of collective identity in and from the Uyghur homeland, but no concept of a nation-state and the ‘Uyghur’ ethnonym.
• Yang Zengxin became worried of the growing Uyghur nationalism.
  • [ q ] The term ‘Uyghur’ was coined by Uyghur Bolshevik sympathizers and recognized by the USSR in the 1920s.
  • [e_c] The nationalist ideology was based on Leninist anti-imperialist revolution and celebrated the history of Uyghur resistance to Chinese rule.
• There was no serious revolt under Yang’s rule, but he made enemies among other Han administrators, leading to his assassination.

Paternalistic Control in Republican Rule and Local Resistance

• Jin Suren became governor of Xinjiang in 1928.
  • Jin was greedier than Yang and failed to spread the wealth sufficiently among the local Muslim elite.
  • He also went against the Muslim population.
    • He established bigger security services than Yang, keeping track on movements with passports. .
    • Large taxes on agriculture and animal butchering
    • State-led land reclamations
    • Forbade hajj pilgrimage.
• When Jin wanted to abolishe the Kumul Khanate, it caused a revolt led by the dead Khan’s son.
• The revolts spread beyond Kumul until all of Xinjiang was in turmoil.
• Sheng Shicai would lead the suppression of Muslim rebels, but then orchestrated a coup against Jin so that Sheng became the leader of Xinjiang.
• He allegedly signed an agreement to divide Xinjiang into north and south, china and Muslim-led, which became the first Eastern Turkestan Republic.
• The first ETR was not really an “Uyghur nation-state.”
  • [ s ] The para-state was built on the common identity of Muslim Turks and desire to remove Chinese rule from their homeland and have indigenous rule.
    • [ q ] But it was not exclusively religious in nature.
      • [ s ] It brought together indigenous intellectuals from all kinds of ideologies:
        • Modernist Muslim nationalists
        • Leninist anti-imperialist liberationists
        • Islamic traditionalists.
• It was short-lived anyway, falling in March 1934.
  • [e_c] Dungan (Hui) sacked it.
    • [e_c] They were driven from Urumqi by the Soviets assisting Sheng’s military.

Sheng Shicai’s Sovietization of Xinjiang

• Initially, Sheng Shicai dealt with the discontent of local Muslims in the region by instituting the first instance of a Chinese administration adopting accommodationist policies towards the Uyghurs that were based in Leninist ideals of anti-imperialism.
  • Sheng created something akin to a Soviet-inspired multi-ethnic state in Xinjiang.
    • He co-opted much of the leadership of the First ETR.
    • greatly increased the number of Muslims in his administration.
  • Other Soviet policies like strengthening the Secret Police, were not liked by the local population.
• After sensing a resurgence of Uyghur nationalism, he rolled back some of the accomodationaist policies.
  • Coincided with Stalin’s own purges.
• Sheng purged anti-Soviet elements 1937/8, then in 1942, he purged pro-Soviet elements.
  • [r_e] Attitudes of Muslim population turned against Sheng.
• In 1944, Sheng was removed from power.
• Soviets continued to plan to undermine China’s control of Xinjiang.
  • [ s ] In 1943 and 1944, USSR disseminated propaganda among Uyghurs highlighting Han colonial rule.
    • [e_p] To incite revolt.

The Second ETR and the apex of Uyghur self-determination in modern China

• In October 1944, Soviets helped Muslim rebels from Gulja to revolt. When they were about to take over Urumqi, Soviets intervened and brokered peace talks with the Guomindang, leading to a Xinjiang coalition government.
  • Three Uyghur intellectuals were given high positions: Isa Yüsüp Alptekin, Muhämmäd Imin Bughra, and Mäsud Sabri.
• The second ETR would rule until 1949 and would be the greatest example of an Uyghur nation state.
  • With Soviet assistance it had many symbols of modern nationhood:
    • journals, newspapers and textbooks, Its own currency, Uniformed army, School system, Flag, National anthem.
  • [ s ] Local Uyghur supporters of the ETR saw it as the first step towards an anti-colonial national liberation movement.
• Once the CCP seized control in 1949, the USSR brokered a meeting between the CCP and ETR. The ETR facilitated the entry of the PLA to Xinjiang and the ETR would be invited to the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in Beijing.
  • The five leaders who fled to Kazakhstan allegedly died in an airplane crash en route to the conference.
  • The other 3 leaders went to Beijing by train.
• The ETR was dissolved.
  • Mäsud Sabri who remained in opposition to the CCP was executed in 1951.

Chinese Communist Rule and the Broken Promises of Ethnic Autonomy, 1949–198

Initial Accomodation and the Role of the Soviet Union

• Soviets encouraged early accomodating policies of the CCP.
  • [r_e] Creation of regions of ethnic autonomy, like the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in 1955. Akin to the Soviet Socialist Republics
    • [ q ] This did not give Xinjiang as much independece as the Soviet Republics. Only given ‘theoretical autonomy.’
    • [ q ] Secession was also condemned as a serious danger to the PRC.
      • [ q ] Through ‘double-speak,’ which labeled all anti-colonial liberation movements inside China as ‘pro-imperialist.’^[As an editorial in a state paper declared in 1951, ‘at this point, any nationality movement that seeks to separate from the Chinese People’s Republic (CPR) to become independent is reactionary since, objectively considered, it would undermine the interests of the various nationalities, and hence would work to the advantage of imperialism.’ Cited in J.T. Dreyer, China’s Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People’s Republic of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 94.]
  • [r_i] Soviet involvement also played a role transforming the social life of Uyghurs. (religious institutions, traditional Muslim courts, state-managed clergy).

The End of Accomodation and the Sino-Soviet Split

• The period of CCP accomodation began to end after autonomy was declared.
  • [e_c] Tensions increased between Mao and Khruschev.
    • [r_e] PRC began banning Soviet influence in the XUAR.
  • [ s ] Hundred Flowers Campaign started in 1956, encouraging people to openly criticize Party policies.
    • [e_p] Anti-Rightist Rectification Campaign followed in 1957, punishing those who the CCP didn’t like.
      • [ q ] This included many former ETR officials.
  • [e_c] PRC was settling more Han in the region.
    • [ q ] The XPCC was established to move de-mobilized soldiers from the PLA to the XUAR.
    • [ q ] 2 million Han came to the region fleeing famine caused by the GLF.
  • [e_c] The GLF initiated the first state policies to discourage Uyghurs from practicing religion.
• [e_c] Uyghurs in the 1950s and 1960s sought ways to flee.
  • [ q ] Largest group went to the USSR.
    • [e_m] They had been accepting Uyghur migrants since 1950s
      • [e_p] To repopulate the USSR after WWII.
• In the spring of 1962, USSR opened its borders for Uyghurs.
  • After a protest in May 1962, 67,000 Uyghurs and Kazakhs crossed the border to the USSR.
  • At the same time, Xinjiang was closing off from the rest of the world.
    • China isolated itself from Soviet Union with XPCC farms as a buffer zone.

The Chaos of the Cultural Revolution and its Assimilationist Policies

• In 1966, Mao started the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
  • Many zealous Han youths who came to Xinjiang would attack Islam and Uyghur Culture
    • [e_m] The major thrust of the revolution was attacking the three olds.
    • [ q ] The impact of these assimilationist actions are less clear given the chaotic ruling powers at the time.
      • [ q ] Regardless, it left an impression on all Uyghurs who lived through the period.
• In this context, an insurgency calling itself Eastern Turkestan People’s Revolutionary Party reportedly emerged between .
  • [r_e] It allegedly carried out attacks on the GPCR.
• The Cultural Revolution likely altered the lives of Uyghurs more than any periods of modern Chinese rule that predate it

Uyghurs and the XUAR In the Reform Period, 1980-2001: Accomodation, Development, and the Intensification of Settler Colonialism

• When Deng Xiaoping became leader of China, there was an opportunity to decolonize the relationship between the PRC and Uyghurs.
  • [e_m] China opened up to the outside world economically.
    • [r_i] Xinjiang could become a bridge instead of buffer between countries.
• Probably During this period, the region became more integrated into China than any time prior.
  • [e_m] China would finally have the capacity and resources.
  • [e_m] Xinjiang’s geostrategic significance.
• They briefly tried to engage Uyghurs as the indigenous population.
• But ultimately decided to forcibly assimilate them and colonize their land.

The 1980s and the Last Attempts at Accomodation

• The 1980s allowed for a Uyghur cultural renaissance and re-emergance of Islam in Xinjiang.
  • [ s ] In 1980, the CCP adopted a resolution calling for cultural and economic reforms in XUAR and allowing many Han officials and XPCC members to return home.
    • [e_c] Hu Yaobang urged them to do so.
    • [r_e] The Uyghur alphabet returned to a modified Arabic script.
    • [r_e] Uyghur schools and university sections repoened
    • [r_e] Mosques were re-established.
    • [r_e] Many newly published Uyghur language works.
  • Hu Yaobang became Party Chairman in 1981 and General Secretary of the CCP in 1982, causing increased freedom for Uyghurs until 1987.
• This period of accommodation started narrowing in its scope by 1987 with the purging of Hu Yaobang, and narrowed even more with the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989.
  • Reforms were thus halted before granting any increased autonomy.

The 1990s: between settler colonialism and integration

• During the 1980s, the PRC wanted to integrate Xinjiang into a reforming PRC by accomodation. In the 1990s by economic opportunity.
  • [e_c] Deng’s reforms brought Uyghurs new opportunities.
• But Uyghur publishing and music was censored more strictly.
• In April 1990, Baren Incident happened.
  • Probably began as a protest by Uyghurs.
  • Leader of this protest, Zäydin Yüsüp, probably did create an organization called Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP).
• The CCP feared an Uyghur uprising.
  • Due to Baren Incident and Urumqi bus bombings (1992).
  • Due to Dissolution of the CCP.
    • Uyghurs who had lived in under the USSR and its fall now hoped that along with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan there would now be an Uyghurstan.
• Thus, PRC security campaign after Baren Incident increased in 1991 (fall of USSR).
  • Targeted Uyghurs’ expressions of nationalism + Uyghurs’ religious revival.
    • [r_e] 1831 Uyghurs arrested between 1990-1995 for various reasons.
    • [r_e] Muslim clergy were now veted strictly.
  • [ q ] It was not merely a reaction to these 2 events.
    • The leaked Document No. 7 made clear suppressing Uyghur religiosity and calls for self-determination was systematic.
      • Requiring stronger presence of military.
      • Enhanced surveillance of Uyghurs and media they consumed.
      • Claimed that Uyghur dissent was supported by ‘international counter-revolutionary foces led by the United States of America.’
• A renewed crackdown in 1997.
  • [e_c] A disturbance broke out in February 1997 in Ghulja. See Ghulja incident.
  • [e_c] Three weeks later there were Urumqi bus bombings (1997).
  • [r_e] Now only men over 18 could visit mosques.
  • [r_e] PRC cut off ties between Uyghurs in Xinjiang and Central Asia.
  • [r_e] Used the newly established Shanghai Cooperation Organization to silence politically active Uyghurs.
  • [r_e] Some youths in the north sought to integrate while others resisted assimilation by taking refuge in Islam.
• The PRC sought to integrate Uyghurs and their homeland more solidly into the state, but without undertaking the accommodations required to incentivize it.
  • [e_m] It was assumed economic liberalization would erase colonial relations.
• Some vewed economic liberalization as a new way of colonizing.
  • [e_c] New Han migrants came and settled for good, due to business reasons.

From Frontier Colony to Settler Colony?

• The colonial relationship between China and Uyghurs is unique.
  • [ s ] The colonial origins have never been fully acknowledged by Chinese states.
    • [r_i] So the region is still a colony of the PRC today.
• During its more than two centuries of history, this colonial relationship has involved a variance in state strategies for controlling the region and its peoples, but these policies have never served to truly integrate the region and its people into modern China.
  • [e_c] They lacked state capacity.
  • [e_c] Distance between Beijing and Xinjiang
  • [e_c] Paternalistic attitudes.
  • [r_e] The region remained a frontier colony on the margins of modern Chiense society.
    • [r_e] Uygurs were able to largely avoid assimilation.
• Due to events in the 1990s, the PC was more directly involved in the region than ever before.
  • [ s ] State-led development was transforming the landscape to look more like the rest of China
    • [ q ] Especially in the north.
  • [ s ] They rolled back political, cultural, and religious freedom of Uyghurs in the name of fighting ‘separatism.’
  • [ q ] The PRC was still able to peacefully integrate Xinjiang into modern China.
    • [ q ] But it would have needed to acknowledge its past colonization and Uyghurs’ indigenous status + accomodations to give Uyghurs a lead role in future development.
• In the early 200s, they would adopt the strategy of suggesting Uyghur dissent was a product of a ‘terrorist threat.’

Next: TWoU.Ch2.How the Uyghurs became a ‘terrorist threat’

Link to original

TWoU.Ch2.How the Uyghurs became a ‘terrorist threat’

Previous: TWoU.Ch1.Colonialism, 1759–2001

Ch 2 How the Uyghurs became a ‘terrorist threat’

How GWOT Identifies its Ambiguous Enemies

• The ‘terrorist’ enemies of the GWOT are deliberately ambiguous
• In many ways, the GWOT is not a war but a narrative that can serve a political tool to advance a variety of agendas.
  • For example, the US would quickly pivot to make its version of GWOT more about fighting ‘rogue states’ than the vaguely defined ‘terrorists’ Bush described.
  • The US set a precedent for outher states. The difference being they would use the War on Terror to fight domestic instead of international enemies.

GWOT’s ‘terrorist lists’

• Within the global anti-terrorism architecture, one of the most important tools is the system of international ‘terrorism lists’.
• There are numerous lists, but the United Nations Security Council’s Consolidated List.
• Because terrorism lists justify state-initiated-violence, the PRC aimed to get Uyghur groups recognized on them immediately after GWOT’s declaration.

Branding Uygurs as a ‘Terrorist Threat’

The ‘Shanghai Five’ and the origins of China’s narrative of the Uyghur ‘terrorist threat’

• The PRC’s concern about Uyghur nationalists would become increasingly important in the Shanghai Five’s meetings.
  • [e_m] It worried Uyghur communities in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan would fuel calls for independence among China’s Uyghurs.
  • [e_c] Ghulja incident and Urumqi bus bombings (1997) were a catalyst.
  • [r_e] 6
• In 1998, they added The Three Evils to the discussion menu: “combating separatism, religious extremism and international terrorism.”
  • The addition of separatism was
• At the 2001 meeting in Shangha, announced new regional security cooperation organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Uzbekistan was added.
  • One of their first orders was to pass the ‘Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism’ adopted in June 2001.
• The Three Evils blurred the lines between 3 perceived threats.
  • For the PRC, the inclusion of separatism was critical to allow combating Uyghur calls for self-determination.
  • The inclusion of terrorism and extremism was more likely the initiative of former Soviet states, which had experience with using ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’ to discredit domestic opponents.
• Engaging with Russian and Central Asian discourses on ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’ allowed the PRC to begin interchangeably using the terrorist and separatist lable.

China’s Campaign for International Recognition of a Uyghur ‘Terrorist Threat’

• On 19 Oct 2001, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry went on a tirade about the East Turkistan National Congress being a terrorist organization.
• Before the UN General Assembly on 11 Nov 2001, he PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tang Jiaxuan, pledged China’s support for the fight against the international ‘terrorist threat’ and signaled the PRC’s emergent framing of Uyghur dissent as a part of that threat. He noted,

  • ‘China is also threatened by terrorism; the “Eastern Turkistan” terrorist forces are trained, equipped and financed by international terrorist organizations; the fight against the “Eastern Turkistan” group is an important aspect of the international fight against terrorism.’

  • Vague suggestions that Uyghur activists were receiving assistance from international terorists were made earlier in 2001, but now for the first time so assertively.
• Due to questions about the vagueness of the claims, a brief explainer was released, entitled ‘Terrorist Activities Perpetrated by “Eastern Turkistan” Organizations and Their Links with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban’
  • [ q ] The document claimed this terrorist threat came from a vague group called “Eastern Turkistan” forces, including 40 organizations around the world.
  • [ q ] It also highlighted 8 of these orgs explicitly advocating violence.
  • [ q ] It also mentions other organizations that had allegedly carried out acts of violence inside and outside of China during the 1990s.
• The majority of these organizations were never heard of before.
  • Sean Roberts did know some of the groups
    • United Committee of Uyghurs’ Organizations (Ittipaq): Few resources, rife with divisions, and no capacity to carry out violence, especially not in China.
    • Easter Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO): Small in number and almost destroyed by Kazakhstan in 1999-2000.
    • Eastern Turkistan Youth League based in Switzerland: Absurd, they were secular and focused on providing information about the Uyghur plight to the international community.
• Only one organization was plausible, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM).
  • [ s ] It was plausible a militant Uyghur group established itself in Afghanistan.
    • [ s ] Proximity to China.
    • [ s ] Openness to offering safe haven to Muslim rebel gropus.
    • [ s ] Widespread negative attitudes of Uyghurs to Chinese rule.
    • [r_i] If it existed, then it’s plausible it might have become associated with Al-Qaeda.
  • [ s ] The document presented more detailed information about ETIM than any other Uyghur Group.
• It didn’t seem these alleged Uyghur militants were serious enough concern in the GWOT, as none of the information about ETIM could be easily corroborated.
  • [ s ] Little evidence about their existence aside from the PRC’s claims.
  • [ s ] The US military found very few Uyghurs among the militants in Afghanistan.
• The PRC persisted in lobbying for the international community to recognize ETIM’s relevance to GWOT.^[ An impressive list of meetings and statements it made about international terrorism: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/3712_665976/]
• In January 2002, they released a more detailed report titled ‘“East Turkistan” Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity.’ - This list offers a snapshot of resentment that was building among Uyghurs, but provides no evidence of a ‘terrorist threat.’ - It did not mention many nationalist groups but focused on ETIM. - There was reason for the US to believe China. - [ s ] The US had detained several Uyghurs who fled Afghanistan for Pakistan in late 2001. - There remained suspicions that China was opportunistically exploiting GWOT to repress Uyghurs.
  • This report would become the foundational document in the flawed narrative abuot the role of Uyghurs in the international ‘terrorist threat.‘

The International Recognition of ETIM as a ‘Terrorist Threat’

• The same day “East Turkistan” Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity was released, PRC representatives pledged $4.6 million in support of US-led rebuilding of Afghanistan.
  • [e_p] To use its support for GWOT as leverage for the US to recognize the ‘terrorist threat’ from the Uyghurs.
    • [ s ] In public statements made by US officials, it was obvious they were feeling pressured by China to do so.
• The US was still disagreeing over the labeling of Uyghur dissent as ‘terrorist threat.’
  • [ s ] At APEC 2001, Bush said the PRC should not use the GWOT as an ‘excuse to persecute minorities.’
  • [ s ] Ambassador Francis Taylor suggested at a Beijing press conference (October 2001) that the US does not consider ‘the East Turkestan organization as a terrorist organization.’
  • [ s ] Lorne Craner reiterated this point in March 2002, noting that the PRC had ‘chosen to label all of those who advocate greater freedom in [Xinjiang], near as I can tell, as terrorists; and we don’t think that’s correct.’
• In August 2002, this attitude changed when the US recognized ETIM as a terrorist group.
  • In August 2002, Richard Armitage drafted a document recognizing ETIM as an international terrorist organization.
  • Two days later, a spokesperson for the US Embassy in Beijing claimed that ETIM had been planning attacks on US interests in collaboration with Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, including a planned attack on the US Embassy in Kyrgyzstan. ^8dqcy9
    • They further attributed all the attacks listed in the January report to the ETIM, while the report attributed them to numerous Uyghur groups. Important difference!
      • [r_e] As a result, this entered the narrative about ETIM which would be consistently portrayed as the singular organization responsible for all alleged Uyghur-perpetrated violence in China during the 1990s.
    • There is little evidence behind this.
      • [ s ] The US Embassy in Bishkek never made a statement on the planned attack.
      • [ s ] Kyrgyzstan authorities only cited the Uyghurs’ possession of maps for all foreign embassies as evidence.
      • [ s ] News about this alleged attack disappeared quickly from the news, at a time when an Al-Qaeda plot against the US would be perceieved as an act of war.
  • It is unclear why the attitude changed between March and August 2002.
    • In December 2002, James Kelly^[Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] would state that the decision was not due to the PRC, but based on independent evidence.
    • Seen years later, Randall Schriver^[the US Deputy Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in 2002] claimed there was credible evidence, but that evidence is classified to this day.
    • It’s unlikely the evidence came from intelligence gathered from the 22 Uyghurs interned at Guantanamo Bay in 2002.
      • [ s ] The transcripts of their tribunals offer no evidence of the group’s ties to either Al-Qaeda or the Taliban, leading the US to release all Uyghur detainess eventually.^[‘The Guantanamo Docket – A History of the Detainee Population,’ The New York Times (last data changed 2 May 2018).]
    • The most likely reason is that the US decision to recognize ETIM as a ‘terrorist threat’ was driven by a need for China’s support in GWOT.

      • “China had been asking us to do that for years and we’d say, ‘Who are these guys? We don’t really see it, we don’t see an organisation, don’t see the activity,’” said Richard Boucher, a Brown University Watson Institute fellow and former assistant secretary of state for central Asia. “It was done to help gain China’s support for invading Iraq.” ^[https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3147220/9/11-20-years-later-how-china-used-attacks-its-strategic]

  • Importantly, the US also actively participated to have the UN designate ETIM a terrorist organization.
    • So the US Department of Treasury was happy when UN included ETIM on its Consolidated List.
• Thus, the PRC succesfully implicated one small group of Uyghurs with the support of the US and the UN.
  • [r_e] It allowed China to arbitrarily label any Uyghur group or individual as a member or associate of ETIM, ultimately placing all Uyghurs under suspicion of potentially being members or sympathizers.
    • [ s ] It would become the justification for two decades of violently repressing Uyghur dissent and eventually Uyghur culture in the name of counterterrorism.
      • [ q ] By providing the PRC with a plausible narrative that a persistent and dangerous terrorist threat existed within the Uyghur community of China.
    • [ s ] When the PRC announced its first terrorism list, it included two Uyghur advocacy groups in Germany, suggesting they were aligned with ETIM.
    • [ s ] The 22 Uyghurs in Guantanamo Bay were held for years as the US military sought to connect them to ETIM, but they were eventually released.

Justifying and Maintaining ETIM’s Branding as a ‘Terrorist Threat’

• After 9/11, the number of ‘terrorism experts’ grew exponentially, coming from academia, intelligence, poilcy and military communities.
• ‘Terrorism experts’ would be critical to maintaining the narrative about ETIM as a ‘terrorist organization,’ but they have constructed a narrative riddled with inaccurate and speculative information.
  • [e_c] Lack of knowledge of Uyghur history, culture and especially language.
  • [e_c] Necessity to present information about organizations where they only have propaganda to work with.
  • [e_m] Having a place in the counterterrorism industrial complex, with a vested interest in the continued existence of ‘terrorist organizations’ and the threats they pose.^[Robert Malley and Jon Finer, ‘The Long Shadow of 9/11: How Counter-terrorism Warps US Foreign Policy,’ Foreign Affairs, 97 (2018), p. 58.]

Early Literature on ETIM: Speculation and Criticism

• After September 2002 listing of ETIM by the US and UN, academics scrambled to evaluate the threat and explaining its nature, which was challenging.
  • [e_c] Reliable information about the group was scarce.
    • [ q ] Prior to 2001, there were no public references in either English or Chinese + no international experts on Uyghurs had heard of the group prior to the release of the November 2001 report.
    • [r_e] Only information on ETIM initally were statements by the PRC, a few sensationalist reports from the 90s about Uyghur militancy, and speculation about how Uyghurs could come into contact with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
• Initially think-thanks assumed ETIM to have long been active in China, but were skeptic at ETIM’s capacity and designation as a ‘terrorist group.’
• In a book by controversial terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna about Al-Qaeda, 3 pages are dedicated to ETIM and Uyghurs. It draws heavily from Chinese government discourse. and only cites two obscure and undetailed sources.
  • [r_e] Since the book was best-selling, many of his assertions would keep showing up in later works about ETIM.
    • [ q ] For exapmle in an academic article published in the Criminology journal in 2003, which prominently cites Gunaratna and takes Chinese government’s documents at face-value.
• A counter-discourse was established among experts too.
  • [ s ] The East-West Center for example, critically analyzed Uyghur violence in the 90s and criticized the validity of a ‘terrorist threat.’
  • [ q ] This counter-dicourse moderated US foreign policy towards Uyghurs, but many in law enforcement and military continued to assume Uyghurs posed a ‘terrorist threat.’
• The narrative about ETIM was further complicated by information emerging frmo the battlefied.
  • In 2004, information was emerging that many in the US military had doubts about at least 12 of the 22 Uyghurs in Guantanamo Bay being accused of being enemy combatants.
  • In December 2003, it was reported that Pakistani military had killed Häsän Mäkhsum in October.
    • [r_e] It became unclear what remained of the organization
  • There was no evidence it had any active military operations in either China or Afghanistan since being designated a terrorist organization.
• All that considered, the initial narrative about an alleged terrorist threat posed by Uyghurs was gradually disappearing from both policy and academic discourse in the US and Europe by 2005.
  • [ s ] This trend was further reinforced in 2006 when the US released five Uyghurs from Guantanamo Bay to Albania.

The Turkistan Islamic Party and the re-birth of the ETIM narrative

• Just as it seemed as if the labeling of Uyghurs as a ‘terrorist threat’ was losing its relevance in the western world, a seemingly new Uyghur militant group made itself known internationally through the internet in 2004, calling itself the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).
  • Hasan Makhsum’s ETIM had no website nor videos, but this new group suddenly had the resources to do so.
  • Its first video released around May 2004 was an Arabic biographical film of Hasan Makhsum and advertised their new website.
    • The video did not get much international attention.
  • According to the website and the film, TIP was the new name adopted by ETIM, and they have made that decision since 2000. This can be disputed.
• In 2006, another Uyghur-made Arabic-language video appeared.
  • Produced by adherents of Abu Musab Al-Suri calling for jihad in East Turkestan.
  • Did not use TIP name, but only had a logo with the name “Turkistan” in the top right corner.
  • Classic propaganda video: black shahada flag, AK-47s, turbans, camouflage and covered faces.
• This renewed a cautious interest among terrorism experts about Uyghurs, but they remained divided over the threat’s extent.
  • In a 2006 The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly issue, two articles were dismissive of the threat, while two, written by a Chinese scholar and by Rohan Gunaratna & Kenneth Pereire made the case that ETIM is closely tied with Al-Qaeda and poses a grave security threat to China.

The 2008 Beijing Olypmics and TIP’s Coming-Out Party

• Only in the run-up to the 2008 Olympics would the interest in Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) become widespread.
  • On 1 March 2008, they released a video message from its Emir, Abdul Haq, warning his group will attack the games.
  • A week later, PRC claimed it foiled an attack on a plane where an Uyghur woman has brought gasoline canisters on board.
  • In due course, Chinese authorities claim to have broken up numerous terrorist plots during the same time.
• These events caught the attention of terorism analysts in the west.
  • In April, Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor writes how ETIM is a real threat to the games etc. etc.
  • In May, Stratfor published a 3-part analysis, suggesting the situation was manipulated by Beijing and events likely had little to do with ETIM.
• Interest was further fueled by more incidents before the Olympic games.
  • A video was released claiming responsibility for Shanghai and Kunming bus bombings, which the Chinese overnment later denied were carried out by Uyghurs.
  • Another promised further attacks a week before the opening ceremonies.
  • There were two violent attacks on military and police in Xinjiang, but there was no evidence to connect them to Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).
• This made Western states acknowledge that China has some legitimate concerns about a terrorist threat from Uyghurs.
• Uyghurs were becoming a politicized issue in domestic US politics, given the Guantanamo Uyghurs.
  • Thomas Joscelyn, ‘counterterrorism expert,’ argued that the Guantanamo Uyghurs had contact with Abdul Haq, who had traind them in Afghanistan, which is proof they were enemy combatants.
• At this time, the PRC added eight people to its terrorism list, including Abdul Haq.

The Post-Olympics Narrative of ETIM

• In the years after the Olympics, the tracking of Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) continued to increase.
• The attention of the larger counterterrorism industrial complex was also caught.
  • In April 2009, the US Treasury placed Abdul Haq on a sanctions list. They killed him in a drone strike in February 2010.
• From 2008-2012, western analytical literature about TIP would expand exponentially.
  • [e_c] The events surrounding the Olympics
  • [e_c] The production of new and better produced videos by TIP and an Arabic-language magazine from 2008.
• The new media from TIP are made as propaganda. It has numerous to convey to different populations.
  • To Chinese government, it wanted to promote an image of strength and capacity to challenge the PRC.
  • To its sponsors in the Arab world, it wanted to demonstrate its religiosity, its knowlege of Salafism, and its association with other jihadist groups.
  • To Uyghurs inside China, it sought to portray a long and cohesive history linking TIP to Uyghurs’ historical struggle against Chinese rule + encourage them to join them in jihad.
• But they were taken at face-vaule by analysts.
  • [e_c] They had to rely on a few videos produced in Arabic and visual cues from the ones in Uyghur
    • [e_c] They lacked Uyghur language skills.
• The 2009 Urumqi Riots were not instigated by TIP, but still attracted the interest of terrorism analysts.
  • Rohan Gunaratna would fuel claims again of a terrorist connection to the riots in an interview for Xinhua.
  • China reported it was arresting more Uyghur terrorists in the post-riot crackdown.
  • These factors were intensified by claims in 2010 of two terrorist plots planned by Uyghurs in Norway and Dubai.
    • [r_e] This appeared to provide evidence that TIP has gone international.
• 2010 saw the publication of two of the most sensationalist books on the Uyghur terrorist threat.
• The literature between 2009-2012 established a more cohesive narrative, but accuracy is still dubious because it’s based on thin evidence.
  • Regional experts generally questioned the validity of TIP’s threat.
  • Terrorism analysts tended to hype it.
    • Relied mostly on TIP sources in Arabic or Turkish.
• So a decade after ETIM’s terrorist designation by the US and UN, questions remain about the group’s origins, actual nature, and extent of threat.

Next: TWoU.Ch3.Myths and realities of the alleged ‘terrorist threat’ associated with Uyghurs

Link to original

TWoU.Ch3.Myths and realities of the alleged ‘terrorist threat’ associated with Uyghurs

Previous: TWoU.Ch2.How the Uyghurs became a ‘terrorist threat’

Ch 3 Myths and realities of the alleged ‘terrorist threat’ associated with Uyghurs

ETIM: The Phantom Terrorist Group

• No group has ever called itself the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement or ETIM.
• But there was an existing group that had a community in Afghanistan between 1998 and 2001 with the intent of starting an insurgency inside China.
• Instead of ETIM, it called itself Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP).
  • [e_p] To honor those who battled with PRC security forces during the Baren Incident, who called their loosely organized group the same. Zäydin Yüsüp.
    • [r_e] Many people thought Hasan Makhsum’s group was the same that fought in Baren.
• Many “terorism experts” suggested this teacher was the actual founder of ETIP in the 40s or 50s.
  • [e_c] Abdulhäkim-Haji Mäkhsum taught both of them.
  • [e_c] Hasan Makhsum publicly linked his group of would-be militants with a long history of Uyghur religious nationalism.
    • This is not misleading, he was just referring to the sentiment shared by Uyghur nationalists.

The Origins of Häsän Mäkhsum’s Uyghur Islamic Nationalism and of His Community in Afghanistan

• Hasan Mahsum’s ideas were formed during the 80s and early 90s.
  • His organization was not influenced by foreign Salafi/Wahhabi thought from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Afghanistan.
    • [ s ] Unlike many Uyghurs who studied in Pakistan, he did not.
    • [ s ] China did not train Uyghurs to fight the Soviets.
  • Hasan Makhsum’s ideas were based on indigenous ideas about Islam.
    • [ s ] He studied Islam under Abdulhäkim-Haji Mäkhsum, whose ideas were inspired by Uyghur religious nationalism instead of Salafi thought.
      • [ s ] One of his students said in an interview with Sean Roberts: the Sheikh promoted a broad educational program, which included studying Qur’an and religious texts, but also local literary classics and the history of both Eastern Turkestan and the world.
        • [r_i] So he was likely inspired by early 20th-century anti-colonial Jadid movements, because the Jadids also promoted anti-colonial awakening grounded in an identity as modernizing Muslims.
  • The Baren Incident affected him, citing the spirit of the group led by Zäydin Yüsüp.
  • In 1997 he would preach to Uyghur exiles in Turkey and Saudi Arabia to start a guerilla war against China, without much success.
  • In early 1998 he traveled to “a land of Jihad in Central Asia”.

Mäkhsum’s Community in Afghanistan to 2001

• Hasan Makhsum and a small group of followers went to Pakistan from Turkey in 1997.
  • [e_p] To move to Afghanistan.
    • [ q ] They were denied entry.
• With approval of Jalaluddin Haqqani, Mäkhsum and his group were able to enter Afghanistan and establish a camp
  • [ q ] But they did not have organizational relations with the Taliban.
• Most eyewitnesses say the Uyghur community led by Makhsum was largely isolated from other militant groups.
  • Abdullah Qarahaji claimed they sheltered 500 Uyghur families and trained the men in using weapons.
  • Qarahaji also said he knew no incidences where people from the camp carried out attacks in China.
    • [ s ] This did not appear to be the purpose. Hasan Makhsum himself said in a video, the purpose was to prepare Uyghurs for a coming widespread Jihad without a specific timeline.
• They did not have internet access to post propaganda, but some of its members did frequently take video footage of themselves.
  • This footage indicate the group’s inactivity and lack of resources.
    • [ s ] Footage never depicts Uyghurs in actual combat
    • [ s ] Never include more than a dozen men, armed with AK-47s.
  • Videos were likely taken only of significant events in the group’s activities.
    • [r_i] They likely depict the full extent of their capacity.
• The available evidence suggests Makhsum’s group was a failed attempt to create a militant movement, and does not support being supported by Al-Qaeda and having ties to Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
  • [ s ] Sean Robert’s research only identifies 5 men dedicated to the establishment of this community in Afghanistan:
    • Hasan Makhsum
    • Abdullah Qarahaji: Makhsum’s deputy.
    • Yüsüp Qadirkhan: Aka Sheikh Bilal.
    • Possibly Emir Abdul Haq who apparently was in charge of training newcomers.
    • A person in pakistan who arranged recruitment of newcomers. src: detaines in Guantanamo Bay.
    • [r_i] Makhsum hoped to create a militant movement, but at most was only able to start an initiative to train individual Uyghurs.
  • The failure was due to a lack of external support and also external restraints.
    • [ s ] According to Abdullah Qarahaji, the group had bad relations with Al-Qaeda.
      • [ s ] He accompanied Makhsum to a large meeting in Kandahar where bin Laden was speaking about the importance of jihad. One of the Uyghurs responded that jihad should focus on areas where religion was under attack (East Turkestan), but they found little to no support.
      • [ s ] Qarahaji also remarked that Arab groups in Afghanistan at the time looked down on Uyghurs as less orthodox Muslims.
      • [r_i] So it’s unlikely they received $300,000 from Osama bin Laden like the Chinese government suggested.
    • [ s ] According to Abdullah Qarahaji, the group also had bad relations with the Taliban, which even restricted them.
      • [ s ] Taliban and Pakistan’s ISI probably sought to use Mäkhsum as a bargaining chip in negotiations with China.
        • [ s ] Kazakhstan used Uyghur nationalists for similar purposes.
        • [ s ] The PRC sought engagement with Taliban while the rest of the world shunned their government.
          • [ s ] In 2000, the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan was the first senior official from a non-Muslim country to meet Mullah Omar. After the meeting, Taliban promised to guarantee no Uyghur groups in Afghanistan would be a threat to China.
            • [r_i] So China probably told Taliban to contain their Uyghurs.
            • [r_e] Taliban brought the members of Mäkhsum’s community to Kabul to monitor them.
              • [r_e] Any fighting force that Makhsum may have gathered and trained in 1998-1999 had been completely neutralized by now.
  • The 22 Uyghurs at Guantanamo did not even recognize Mäkhsum’s community as an actual organization.^[Hasan Makhsum’s camp was barely functional]
    • [ q ] They described it as a group of Uyghurs brought together by difference circumstances and a shared disdain for Chinese rule.
      • [ q ] In fact, none of the detainees had ever heard of Al-Qaeda until they were sent to Guantanamo. As one detainee noted in making this point, ‘a billion Chinese enemies, that is enough for me; why would I get more enemies?’
    • [ s ] The makeshift training camp outside Jalalabad had bad living conditions.
      • There was barely any training except running in the morning and occassionaly shooting the only AK-47 of the camp.
      • One detainee said: “it was a little Uigher community where Uighers went; I do not know what you mean about the place called camp.”
  • Somewhere in 2001-2002, Hasan Makhsum and his group marched towards Pakistan. From a video, it looks as if at most 20 followers are present.
    • During this time, he called RFA to give an interview, in which he condemned the 11 September attacks and denied his group had any organizational ties or received financial support from either Taliban or Al-Qaeda.^[https://www.rfa.org/english/news/politics/85871-20020127.html]
  • What happened in Pakistan is murky.
    • [e_c] Why Makhsum was killed in 2003 is unclear.
    • Abdullah Qarahaji fled Pakistan fora enw safe haven.
  • Conclusion: It’s absurd that ETIM is classified a ‘terrorist organization’
    • [ s ] No organization by this name existed
    • [ s ] This group never had close connections or funding from Taliban or Al-Qaeda.
    • [ s ] No evidence that the community (which was established in 1998) had anything to do with violent acts perpetrated by Uyghurs between 1990-2002.
      • [ s ] No evidence that it ever carried out any attacks on the PRC or anyone else.
    • [ s ] Two years after its designation, its leader was now dead and his community decimated.
    • Yet ETIM still remained on terrorism lists and Uyghurs are still feeling the consequences.

The Turkistan Islamic Party, 2004-2012: A Video Production Company with a Militant Wing

• According to TIP, they were a continuation of ETIP and the name change had taken place in 2000 before Makhsum’s death. ^a80297
  • There are no writings or recordings about this change prior to the website.
    • [ s ] Makhsum uses the name ETIP in his interview with RFA in 2002, explicitly mentioning this name was adopted in memory of Zäydin Yüsüp.
• It is likely this group was established gradually as Emir Abdul Haq asserted his leadership and began cultivating a new community.
  • [ s ] They only let their leadership known in 2008, even though they announced that Abdul Haq took over leadership immediately after Makhsum’s death.
• He aligned himself and his group more closely with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban than Hasan Makhsum.
  • [e_m] Waziristan was controlled almost completely by Al-Qaeda and TTP at the time.
  • [ s ] He might have wanted more external support for jihad than Makhsum succeeded in doing.
• By 2008, it was clear they were fully aligned with Al-Qaeda.
  • [ s ] Islamic Turkistan was published by a press usually associated with Al-Qaeda.
  • [ s ] It was reported an Al-Qaeda spox that OBL had appointed Abdul Haq as Emir of TIP and the leader of ‘Al-Qaeda in China’ (which was never heard of again after the announcement).
• Islam Awazi’s video production increased quality and quantity from 2008-2012, but that did not mean they had more Uyghur fighters.
  • [ s ] The videos - until 2011 - show few contemporary fighters. They inherited a lot of video footage from Makhsum’s community in Afghanistan.
  • [ s ] Until 2011 there were only five Uyghurs in Waziristan who appeared in these videos.
    • Emir Abdul Haq: He was the only core member of TIP who was substantively involved with Mäkhsum’s community, while the others were more engaged with the TTP.
    • Abdushukur (deputy of Emir Abdul Haq)
    • Säyfullah (TIP Commander)
    • Abdullah Mansur (Islam Awazi Producer)
    • Abduläziz (Uyghur Religious Scholar)
  • [ q ] Jacob Zenn noted that “given the prolific video production of Islam Awazi, TIP ‘appeared to be more of a propaganda group with a militant wing than a militant group with a propaganda wing.”^[Jacob Zenn, ‘The Turkistan Islamic Party in Double-Exile: Geographic and Organizational Divisions in Uighur Jihadism,’ Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, 16:17 (2018), 8–11.]
• They had two different purposes with their proapganda.
  • Getting Muslims in Xinjiang to wage jihad against the PRC.
  • Getting international jihadist networks to turn their attention towards China.
    • [ s ] Islamic Turkistan and their Arabic and Turkish videos were directed to potential funders and supporters from outside.
• By 2010, it had very little personal connection left to Makhsum.
  • [ s ] After Emir Abdul Haq died, the group was led by 2 Uyghurs who were in the Taliban and one young Salafi religious teacher.
    • [ q ] and Abdushukur became the new Emir. Abdullah Mansur became his deputy. Abdulaziz took over media production.
  • [ q ] Yet they continued to use Makhsum’s footage to evoke his role in the group’s history.
• Changes to TIP’s capacities and goals happened in 2011 making it evolve into a more mature militant organization.
  • [e_c] By 2011, TIP had become a part of the international jihad movement, but mostly inconsequential with a dozen fighters.
    • Starting in 2011, Abduläziz (Uyghur Religious Scholar) would constantly feature in TIP’s videos with many about his lectures on jihad, but also many about other ethnic groups with whom Uyghurs were fighting in Waziristan, especially Turks, Tatars and Muslims from the Caucasus.
      • [r_i] They reveal what ties the group had formed since 2003 with other non-Arab forces.
        • [ s ] Several videos about a Turkish jihadist who fought with Uyghurs
        • [ s ] A series of videos in Russian and Uyghur highlighting their collective home as Khorasan.
          • [r_i] This suggests multi-national consciousness among TIP’s Uyghurs.
    • [ q ] Despite this, TIP remained largely inspired by the Uyghur cause.
      • [ s ] Their most emotional videos were still about Xinjiang.
      • [ s ] They had two flags, the black shahada flag, and a light blue Uyghur flag with shahada.
      • [ s ] It claimed to have directly influenced the 2011 Kashgar attack.
        • [ q ] TIP did not take credit for ordering the attack but released a video celebrating the attack.
  • [e_c] New recruits joined in 2011.
    • [ s ] Videos emerged during 2011 showing new Uyghur faces.
    • [e_c] The situation in Xinjiang was increasingly oppressive, so many went to Turkey, but it’s possible some went to Waziristan.
  • [ s ] There were other indicators that TIP was evolving.
    • In Dubai, authorities had allegedly foiled a planned terrorist attack from Uyghurs with connections to ETIM/TIP.
    • In Norway, an Uyghur refugee was arrested for allegedly planning a terrorist attack for Al-Qaeda with 2 Uzbek and Kurdish men.
      • In an interview with Sean Roberts, he admitted he planned to bomb the Chinese embassy in Oslo, but denied he was working with TIP or Al-Qaeda.
• TIP until the end of 2012 was neither a powerful guerrilla warfare force nor a ‘terrorist organization’
  • [ s ] It was first and foremost a shell organization whose primary activity was video production.
    • [ s ] It sought to brand itself as a jihadist group that could threaten China.
• By the end of 2012, TIP would become an entirely different organization.
  • Abdushukur, Säyfullah, and Abduläziz are killed in drone strikes.
    • The only one left from TIP’s original core group was Abdullah Mansur.
    • [r_e] This made the group increasingly anti-American as well as anti-Chinese.

What Makes a Terrorist Organization?

• What makes a terrorist organization depends on one’s definition of terrorism.
  • Whether a group ends up on the UN’s Consolidated List depends only on their association with Al-Qaeda, Taliban, or Daesh.
    • [r_i] Therefore, ETIP should never have been listed, but TIP would qualify because of its association with Al-Qaeda and Taliban.
  • Based on The War on Uyghurs’ definition, neither Makhsum’s group nor TIP qualify.
    • [ s ] Neither has a clear record of carrying out premeditated political violence that deliberately targets civilians.
      • [ s ] Makhsum’s group never carried out any political violence at all.
      • [ q ] TIP’s case is more debatable. In 2012, it was rather a small and loosely affiliated group of Uyghurs participating in multi-national para-military groups that were fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan. ^5d3854
        • [ s ] It claimed to have carried out the Shanghai and Kunming bus bombings, but the PRC denied these claims.
        • [ s ] There were credible but questionable claims of TIP planning terrorist attacks in Dubai and Oslo, but the organization did not claim credit for either.
        • [ s ] It’s questionable whether TIP had the capacity to carry out any acts of violence prior to 2012.
        • [ s ] TIP was united due to their video production, not participation in Afghansitan conflict.
        • [ s ] TIP probably did not pose a viable security threat to the PRC.
          • There is no clear evidence they are able to carry out violence inside china, except for the 2011 Kashgar attack which involved 1 person who was trained by them a few years earlier.
          • There is no evidence their videos had a wide audience in Xinjiang, and there were very few premeditated acts of political violence by Uyghurs during GWOT’s first decade.

Next: TWoU.Ch4.Colonialism meets counterterrorism, 2002–2012

Link to original

TWoU.Ch4.Colonialism meets counterterrorism, 2002–2012

Previous: TWoU.Ch3.Myths and realities of the alleged ‘terrorist threat’ associated with Uyghurs

Ch 4 Colonialism meets counterterrorism, 2002–2012

State Propaganda’s Transition from Separatists to Terrorists and the Early Years of China’s ‘War on Terror’

• Initially, the recognition of ETIM as a terrorist threat had little impact on Uyghurs.
• The only thing that changed was Chinese discourse.
  • ‘Combating separatism’ became counter-terrorism.
  • ‘Exremism’ was increasingly used to signal dissent.
  • [r_e] The discoursive shift provided a convenient justification for intensifying PRC’s policies in Xinjiang.
    • [ q ] Adding vague new amendments to their criminal legal code in December 2001 adding ‘terrorism crimes.’
    • [ q ] New crackdown by security organs.
      • [r_e] Leading to many arrests and imprisonment
      • [r_e] Limiting religious observation.
    • [ q ] This was similar to the 90s crackdown, but more aggressive since counterterrorism justified it.

‘Open Up the West’ Before the 2009 Urumqi Riots: Integration or Settler Colonialism?

• State-led development in Xinjiang increased in the 90s but its benefits were geographically and ethnically unequal.
  • [ s ] Most development occured in the north, where 88% of Han lived, while ths south with 80% of all Uyghurs experienced little change.
  • [r_e] Two critical development projects were launched in the 90s
    • [e_p] To link the north and south and facilitate better regional development.
    • [ q ] The construction of the Taklamakan Desert Highway between Urumqi and souther Khotan completed in 1995, and a new rail line from Urumqi to Kashgar completed in 1999.
• Open Up the West hoped to stop Uyghurs and Tibetans calling for self-determination, by assuming that economic growth would ease ethnic tensions.
  • [e_c] Because of outdated theories of modernization from the 50s that assumed economic opportunities would pacify people.^[Related to the The myth of progress?]
  • [ q ] However, development to resolve ethnic tension should address structural racism and ethnic organization.
    • [ q ] The campaign didn’t do that. It only focused on mega-projects related to energy, natural resource exploitation and transportation infrastructure.
• The Open Up the West projects contributed to connecting Xinjiang with other economies, but in many ways worsened tensions between Uyghurs and the state.
  • [e_c] Infracstructure further militarized the region (XPCC).
  • [e_c] Uyghurs associated the campaign with an increase in Han migration.
    • [r_e] Which appeared to Uyghurs as an attempt to intrude their homeland instead of an attempt to help them.
  • [ q ] A small handful of Uyghurs became wealthy, especially in Urumqi. But the majority found themselves alienated.
• The displacement and cultural destruction during 2000-2010 was most felt in Kashgar, the historical center of Uyghurs’ urban culture.
  • [ s ] The heart of the city, which contained the best-preserved examples of traditional Central Asian urban residential architecture was demolished.
    • [e_p] To modernize and turn it into an international hub of commercial activity.
    • [e_m] Geographic location along routes to the west and south-west.
  • [ q ] It was not unique. Many traditional Uyghur communities were being displaced and symbols of Uyghur culture erased.

Assimilating Uyghurs in the Name of Modernization and Counterterrorism

• During the early 2000s, projects to ‘integrate’ Uyghurs became more colonial.
  • [e_c] State-sponsored programs were created with the purpose of integrating Uyghurs into Han culture.
    • [r_e] These policies would drive a wedge between the youth and their parents’ generation.
    • Example: its bilingual education program. Started in 1990s, a lot of money invested into Chinese-language instruction.
      • [ s ] In 2002, Uyghur language track closed at Xinjiang University in all subjects except Uyghur language and literature.
      • [ s ] In 2004, regional government decided students at all educational levels receive mandatory instruction in Mandarin, actually a ‘covert policy of monolingual education’
        • [ s ] Most non-Han language schools were merged into Chinese-language schools.
        • [ q ] Accompanied with less publications produced in non-Chinese languages
          • [r_e] Uyghur language slowly dissapearing from media
        • [ q ] Accompanied with a trend of producing periodicals/radio/tv in non-Chinese language which were merely translations of Chinese material.
          • [r_e] Uyghur narratives being wiped out.
    • Example 2: ‘Xinjiang Class,’ boarding schools in inner for minority students that focused on political indoctrination like attempts to strip students of any religious beliefs.
    • Example 3: Sending workers to inner China to work and live in factory dormitories with Han.
      • [ q ] One of them sent young Uyghur women from rural areas in the south, to factories accompanied by language and ideological training.
        • [e_p] Perhaps hoping to increase inter-ethnic marriage.
• These programs still only affected a small percentage of Uyghurs.
  • [r_i] So these programs did not their intended purpose.

The Turning Points: The 2008 Olympics and the 2009 Urumqi Riots

• PRC increased security everywhere to prevent disruption of Beijing Olympics 2008.
• Minister of public security announced terrorism is the greatest threat to Olympics in 2007.
  • Weird since almost no violent incidents with Uyghurs since 90s, and nothing has been heard of ETIM since then.
• Beijing’s terrorism rhetoric increased considerably in spring of 2008.
  • [e_m] The video released by Emir Abdul Haq threatening to attack the games.
  • [e_c] Foiled “terrorist attacks”
    • [ q ] 7 March 2008: authorities grounded a plane from Urumqi to Beijing where a Uyghur woman had reportedly brought gasoline canisters on board.
    • [ q ] April 2008: PRC announced it broke up 2 terrorist cells, arrested 45 Uyghurs with bomb making materials.
      • Many journalists believed this was a fabrication by the government to send a message of strength to deter any disruption.
      • Others noted the seized material couldn’t even create a car bomb.
• It increased more over the coming months due to Shanghai and Kunming bus bombings.
  • [r_e] PRC adopted extreme security measures towards Uyghurs.
    • Quarantining them from society.
      • [ s ] They were denied hotel rooms in Beijing.
      • [ s ] As many as 4k-5k were either detained or expelled from Beijing.^[https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/beijing-busy-welcoming-the-world-as-it-turns-away-its-ethnic-minorities/article656845/].
      • [ q ] It did the same to Tibetans, but not as harsh.
        • [e_c] Uyghurs were seen as potential terrorists. Not just protesters.
    • Also increased security efforts, where any Uyghur displaying open religiosity was monitored during the duration of the Olympics. need_sources
• 2008 Kashgar attack and 2008 Kucha attack occured.
  • Little is known about the motivations for these attacks.
    • [ s ] TIP did not claim responsibility.
    • [ s ] It is unclear whether they were meant to be political statements timed for the Olympics, acts of rage in response to the crackdown, or a reaction to somethingn entirely else.
    • They were more likely a response to the tight controls China put on Uyghurs.
  • [r_e] They fueled the hysteria surrounding terrorism and the Olympics.
• CCP Secretary Wang Lequan declared a ‘life or death struggle’ against terrorists.
  • 200,000 public security officers and armed police were mobilized.
  • Official orders were given to puish families and neighbors of those suspected of being involved in the attacks.
    • 1,300 Uyghurs were arrested for state security crimes in 2008.
• 2009 Urumqi Riots occured.
  • [r_e] Would further fuel state and Han citizen fear of Uyghurs.
    • [r_i] This shows how Han migrants in the region viewed the local Uyghur population. Racist stereotypes.
    • [ q ] Unleashed unparalleled demonization of Uyghurs, comparable to Islamophobia in the US after 9/11. The Urumqi riots are also called ‘7/5’
  • [r_i] Shows how Uyghur resistance to Chinese rule had now become focused on the Han as a people rather than just government.
  • [r_e] The state included crackdown on religious Uyghurs ‘terrorists,’ ‘extremists,’
  • [r_e] The state responded by putting the entire region under lockdown for almost an entire year.
    • [ s ] Official response was to further increase security measures.
      • [ s ] Like martial law for the next year.
      • [ s ] Extensive searches for Uyghurs involved with the riots.
    • [ s ] Tight restrictions on communication.
      • [ s ] Internet locally was shut down, only restoring it step by step between December 2009 and May 2010.
      • [ s ] Text messaging were blocked until January 2010.
      • [ s ] Cell phone calls were blocked until December 2009.

Expediated Development, 2010-2012

• Instead of seeing the riots as a result of the pressures of development, China viewed the riots as an indication of ‘underdevelopment.’
  • [ s ] The new Party Secretary, Zhang Chunxian supported this.
• To fix this, they wanted to develop Xinjiang. Looking to settler colonization for inspiration
  • [ s ] Strategy differed little from those they’ve been pursuing since the 90s, but now it’s more overtly assimilationaist, especially in its attempt to change the landscape and demographics of the region.
• Several policies and programs started
  • The program Pairing Assistance Program (PAP) was initiated.
    • This was done not just to develop but also to reassure stability to Han migrants in the region.
      • [e_c] Han population lost conficence in local PRC administrations, so they hoped inner China administration to help them better.
  • The establishment of Special Economic Trading Areas (SETAs)
    • In Khorgus on Kazakhstan border
      • [ q ] Remote border town that could easily be built up from scratch.
    • In Kashgar near Kyrgyzstan border
      • [r_e] Densely populated Uyghur-majority city, critical to Uyghur history and identity was destroyed. ^aab1c6
        • [r_e] Uyghur inhabitants moved to concrete apartment buildings on the margins/outside the city.
          • [r_e] Caused a housing boom, majority of new apartments bought by speculators from inner China.
      • [r_e] Uyghur inhabitants physically displaced and social capital destroyed. ^0a4685
        • [e_c] Developing into SETA necessitates displacement and destruction. Old city had to be destroyed and they planned to build industrial park.
        • [e_c] Many PAP projects involved building new housing, which was provided to Uyghurs who were displaced due to development, but was not like traditional builldings, so breaks down social capital of existing neighborhoods.
      • [r_e] Uyghur elites benefited, but most wouldn’t benefit.
        • [ s ] Discriminatory hiring practices had become increasingly prevalent after 2009 riots and even state institutions.
          • [ q ] Justified as linguistically driven.
      • [r_e] Marginalization of Uyghur influence on city’s development.
        • [e_c] Chinese companies began to dominate the economy
        • [e_c] Demographic balance was shifting
        • [e_c] Uyghur cultural characteristics began to disappear
    • [r_e] More intense efforts to assimilate Uyghurs through work & education programs.
      • [ s ] ‘bilingual education’ initiative was realized
      • ~[ s ] After Urumqi riots, work programs canceled
• These were accompanied with new assimilationist trends.
  • [r_e] It was feared ethnic autonomy model for China led to the dissolution of USSR and Yugoslavia, and China should use a melting pot approach.

Uyghur Resistance and State Counterterrorism, 2010-2012

• Additionally, more securitization started in 2010.
  • [ q ] Especially intense in the south.
    • Monitoring and control
      • [ s ] Limits imposed on traveling outside home region.
      • [ s ] Frequent checkpoints between cities
      • [ s ] Ethnically profiled random searches
    • Controlling practice of Islam
      • [ s ] Using public institutions to
        • regulate Uyghurs’ public behavior, belief and dress.
        • Prevent Uyghur children from embracing Islam
        • Control what religious leaders tell them.
• Violent resistance broke out as a result.
  • China called them all terrorist attacks, but most were clashes between Uyghurs and law enforcement.
  • First an alleged bombing of police station in Aksu, August 2010.
  • Two incidents in Kashgar and Khotan
    • A few weeks later in Kashgar, mini-van exploded.
    • Next day, riot broke out beginning in a restaurant.
    • TIP claimed responsibility.
      • [r_e] PRC criticized Pakistan for harboring Uyghur terrorists
    • Local Uyghur said they were local people angry with the government and the Han chinese.
• Each time violence occured, heavy-handed response would make things worse.
• What the state framed as “terrorist attacks” were really just armed self-defense against police and security forces.
  • Uyghurs in Guma region were shot dead after police thought they were going to Pakistan and they took hostages.
• Violence increased in frequency in 2012.
  • February, Karghilik, Uyghur youth killed 13 Han migrant on the street for unknown reasons. Shot dead by police.
  • March, Korla, police killed 4 Uyghurs during a raid on an ‘illegal religious gathering’
  • June, Khotan, 6 Uyghurs apprehended for allegedly planning to hijack a plane.
  • June, Khotan, raid on an illegal religious school. Severe burn injuries to multiple Uyghur children.
  • August, 20 Uyghurs charged for separatism for information they posted online.
  • October, Korla, clashes between Uyghurs and Han civilians.
  • October, near Karghilik, Uyghur carried out alleged suicide attack on a border post on ‘National Day’
• The sporadic nature tells us this was not an organized insurgency but an outgrowth of growing tensions between an increasingly invasive security apparatus.
• This is a logical outcome of the security-obsessed GWOT narrative.
• One of the few attempts by Uyghurs to peacefully protest in 2009 was repressed and spiraled into violence.
• Handful of Uyghur jihadists in Waziristan sought to insert themselves into the mix but they were rather a sideshow.

---

Next: TWoU.Ch5.The self-fulfilling prophecy and the ‘People’s War on Terror,’ 2013–2016

Link to original

TWoU.Ch5.The self-fulfilling prophecy and the ‘People’s War on Terror,’ 2013–2016

Previous: TWoU.Ch4.Colonialism meets counterterrorism, 2002–2012

Ch 5 The self-fulfilling prophecy and the ‘People’s War on Terror,’ 2013–2016

• 2013 Tiananmen Square SUV attack was the first time the violence in Xinjiang spilled over to mainland.
  • [r_e] China blamed TIP.
    • [ q ] TIP congratulated the attack, but did not take responsibility or claim any links.
  • [ q ] It was likely a result of tensions between security organs and Uyghurs in southern Xinjiang.
    • [ s ] Its rudimentary nature.
    • [ s ] A man, wife and mother are a strange terrorist cell combination.
    • [ s ] Some sources suggest it was a case of self-immolation to protest the destruction of a mosque in their hometown of Akto.
• Violent attacks by Uyghurs increased over the coming three years.
  • [r_i] The increasing attacks over the coming three years imply several things.
    • [r_i] There was no international jihadist threat.
      • [ s ] All incidents had their own local peculiarities.
    • [r_i] How widespread frustration and rage had become.
      • [ s ] So many acts of violence were carried out that were isolated from each other.
  • [r_e] PRC responded to the increase in violent resistance with an escalation of its own state-led violence.
    • [ s ] Intense security measures would overshadow the Pairing Assistance Program (PAP) projects started earlier.

Self-fulfilling Prophecies and Uyghur Militancies

• Self-fulfilling prophecy originated with sociologist Robert Merton.
  • He describes it as a false assessment about a social problem that leads to social or policy actiosn that make the false assessment a reality. Once this false Once this false assessment becomes a reality, it further justifies the actions that facilitated its existence.
    • In his words:

      this specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of error; for the prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was right from the very beginning.

  • Example is structural racism in the US during the 40s. Beliefs that black people were intellectually inferior ⇒ less investment into their education ⇒ less black people in colleges ⇒ justifying the original belief.
• It can help us understand how PRC policies lead to actual Uyghur militancy and terrorist attacks.

Escalating Violence, Counterterrorism, and Counter-Extremism, 2013

• Violence was on the rise in 2013.
  • Uyghur and Han citizens clashed for unknown reasons
    • Korla, March.
    • May, Karghilik.
  • Most other incidents were violence between security organs and Uyghurs.
    • Gasoline bomb thrown at police station in March, Khotan.
    • Murder of two community policemen in April, Khotan.
  • Bloodiest took place in Lukqun (near Turpan): 2013 Lukqun incident
• Most of it went unreported, we know only of them because of social media.
  • Aside from the 2013 Lukqun incident and 2013 Tiananmen Square SUV attack, another was much reported on: 2013 Maralbeshi incident
• As a result, new effort seeking to link growing violence to religious ideologies they would label ‘extremism.’
  • [ q ] This was more than just punishing religious practice outside state institutions, but identifying physical signs and cultural practices of those who might hold “extreme” religious beliefs.
  • [ s ] According to one counter-terrorism expert, this was aided by an internal document called ‘Several Guiding Opinions on Further Suppressing Illegal Religious Activities and Combating the Inflitration of Religious Extremism in Accordance with the Law’ (Document No. 11).
• One example was the Project Beauty campaign
  • Implemented especially in the south.
  • In Kashgar, checkpoints were instituted to police women’s facial coverings.
  • Women wearing veils in public were written up and forced to participate in re-education.
• Not just in public, but at home too. 200,000 cadres were deployed to 9,000 villages to live and intermingle with local population.
  • More regular house-to-house searches to evaluate the behaviors of Uyghurs in private and todetermine whether they met the expectation of ‘extremism.’
• Proactive actions against alleged extremists.
  • Raids on any gathering of Uyghur men, characterized as “uncovering a terrorist cell.”
    • Usually all men were killed, so little evidence of what actually happened.
    • Examples:
      • August 2013, authorities killed 15 Uyghurs who were surrounded while praying in a desert location.
      • In Poskam area, 12 Uyghurs killed who were in a rural area to ‘train in preparation for terrorist acts.’
      • Similar incidents around Kashgar and Yarkand killed 7 more Uyghurs in September and early October.
    • [r_e] Local towns were virutally locked down.
• The 2013 Tiananmen Square SUV attack provoked the fastest response.
  • Five Uyghurs in Khotan were arrested who allegedly planned the car crash.
• Violence would continue into 2014.
  • Nine Uyghur youth attacked a police station with axes and knives in Maralbeshi.
  • In December, an alleged raid in Kshgar’s old city. 16 Uyghurs killed including 6 women. Unclear what happened.

The Turning Point: March-May, 2014

• First few months of 2014 were calm.
• In March: 2014 Kunming train attack.
  • This was the first time since the Urumqi bus bombings (1997) that an Uyghur-perpetrated violent act could reliably be called a terrorist attack.
  • TIP released a video praising the attack. but did not claim responsibility.
  • The attackers appeared to be acting on their own, not ordered by international terrorist orgs.
    • [ s ] According to state officials, they tried to leave China through SEA but were blocked so they were stuck in Kunming without any residency documents.
  • [r_e] Han islamophobic fears increased.
  • [r_e] Xi, CCP General Secretary, visited Xinjiang in late April. He announced the ‘Strike First’ campaign.
• As Xi was leaving, an Uyghur set off an explosion in Urumqi train station. One other person died, but 79 injured.
  • TIP issued a video about the attack, featuring Emir Abdul Haq, who was presumed dead since 2010. (wtf?)
  • [r_e] Led to escalation of securitization in south.
    • [r_e] Protest in Aksu over detention of women wearing headscarves.
• Two days after Aksu protests, another attack in Urumqi. Urumqi SUV attack (May 2014)
• In total 98 violent incidents reported involving Uyghurs and police or Han civilians in 2013 and 2014 so far.
• The week after Urumqi SUV attack (May 2014), Zhang Chunxian announced the People’s War on Terror.
  • Zhang signaled the war should be about ideology first of all.
• Second Xinjiang Work Forum laid the emphasis on stability instead of development.
• Xinjiang was now important for the Belt and Road Initiative.
  • Stability was now the precursor to development instead of the other way round.
• Stability was now premised on a strategy of dismantling Uyghur identity.
  • [r_e] Setting the tone for new assimilationist policies.

The People’s War on Terror, 2014-2016

• An attempt to cleanse Uyghurs of Islamic influences while trying to instill PRC nationalism at the same time.
  • [ q ] By violently punishing ‘extremists’
  • [ q ] Wider efforts to alter social behavior and cultural practices.
    • Further implementing Project Beauty campaign among both women and men.
    • Intensifying anti-religious education.
    • Attempts to prevent Uyghurs from doing some religious practices.
    • Having citizens monitor each other.
• It was very extreme from the start.
  • In schools, students actively discouraged from the start.
  • Students were encouraged to report on religious behavior from their parents
  • Public anti-extremism campaigns
    • prevent fasting during Ramadan
    • Promote alcohol and cigarettes
    • Increase surveillance of mosque attendance and religious rituals (circumcision, weddings).
  • Encouraging community to report who was religious.
  • Anti-religious murals.
  • Monetary incentives to promote inter-ethnic marriage between Han and Uyghurs.
• The campaign also targeted irreligious intellectuals and nationalists
  • [ s ] Increased surveillance of Uyghur-language internet for religious or nationalist content.
    • [r_e] Led to arrest of Ilham Tohti.
      • [e_c] He created an internet forum that encouraged honest discussion between Uyghurs and Han. (uighuronline.cn)
• In 2015, new Counterterrorism Law implemented, to codify the assimilationist policies already going on in some regions.
  • Very broad understanding of “extremism” but included any political act.
    • [ s ] Articles 80 and 81 include a variety of vague extremist activities
      • “using methods such as intimidation or harassment to interfere in the habits and ways of life of other persons”
      • activities regarding the promotion of religion
      • actions meant to discourage people from living or interacting with other ethnicities.
  • Particularly parents were targeted for any actions they might take in the course of parenting their children.
• Laws were reinforced with new ‘Religious Affairs Reglations’. They were intended to distinguish between legal and illegal expressions of Islam.
  • [e_m] To codify many anti-religion policies that were already undertaken.
  • They remained vague.
    • [ s ] Article 38 prophibited people from adopting an ‘appearance, clothing and personal adornment, symbols, and other markings to whip up religious fanaticism, disseminate religious extremist ideologies, or coerce or force others to wear extremist cloghint, religious extremist symbols, or other markings.’
• The People’s War on Terror also increased violent policing of Uyghurs that had been escalating since 2011.
  • Public execution of 55 alleged Uyghur terrorists in Ghulja immediately after PWOT declaration.
  • 200 alleged terrorists arrested after a sweep.
• Violent incidents once again increased in 2014
  • July, five judicial officials assassinated in Aksu
  • August, assassination of Imam of Kashgar’s main mosque who was a vocal supporter of counter-terrorism measures.
• Most brutal violence occured in Elishqu in late July 2014.
  • CCP said it was a mass terrorist attack.
  • Uyghur sources asserted it was the result of repression of a protest responding to Ramadan restrictions.
  • 96 people died according to the state, but WUC would claim as many as 2000 Uyghurs were claimed.
  • [r_e] Area under complete lockdown, even 2 years later.
• Violence continued in 2015
  • Now also at checkpoints that had become common everywhere.
    • Alleged suicide attacks in Lop and Qaraqash in May.
    • • one in Kashgar in June.
  • Most violent incident of 2015 is 2015 Aksu Coal Miner incident ^5cuql0
    • CCP only reported on it 2 months later, claiming it was international terror.
    • Uyghurs told Sean Roberts it involved a land dispute.
    • Security forces killed 28 Uyghurs on the spot without arresting them.
• Securitization level up!
  • By 2016, many Uyghur neighborhoods fenced off and surveilled by police and CCTV.
  • Call to prayer was outlawed.
  • Some Arabic children’s names were outlawed.
  • [r_e] Psychologically scarring Uyghurs
    • [e_c] Peak securitization in summer 2016.
      • [ s ] A lot of pressure, including almost nightly checks on households.
      • [ s ] Quarantining rural Uyghurs out of urban areas.
        • [ q ] Through scrutiny of residency permits.

Exodus from the Homeland

• Likely at least 30,000 Uyghurs left China between 2010-2016.
  • [r_i] So its the greatest exodus since 1962 when Uyghurs fled to Soviet Kazakhstan.
• Since 2006, most Uyghurs had great difficulties obtaining passports for international travel.
  • [ q ] Those that had passports, they had to be housed with state travel agencies or local police.
  • [r_e] Many Uyghurs, especially in South, began using human trafficking routes through Southeast Asia.
• Since the 2009 Urumqi Riots, Uyghurs would flee from SEA.
  • [ s ] Cases of extradition
    • December 2009, Cambodia, 18 Uyghurs
    • March 2010, Laos, 7 Uyghurs
    • 2011-2012, Malaysia, 17 Uyghurs
  • Nobody knew how many Uyghurs were fleeing until 2014.
    • [ q ] Thai ahtorities arrested 424 Uyghur men, women and children in Songkhla province.
      • In 2015, 170 were sent to Turkey, mainly women and children
      • 109 men sent to China.
• Most of these refugees had come from southern towns in Xinjiang.
  • [ s ] Anecdotal. Interviews conducted in Kayseri during 2016 by Sean Roberts.
    • They mentioned the pressure from police was the primary factor. (constant household inspections and harassment).
    • Other factors were the inability to peacefully practice Islam, and mandatory education in Chinese-language schools.
    • Knowledge of the trafficking routes spread by word of mouth, but some said Han traffickers came directly to their village to ask if they wanted to leave.
• Chinese gov never recognized the scale of it, but when it acknowledged that it was occuring, it suggested the trafficking ring was founded by Islamic extremists to bring Uyghurs to fight in global jihad.
• Robert’s interviewees never claimed they left China to join militant groups. But some were recruited by TIP.
  • [ s ] According to Uyghur activists, there was another Turkish Uyghur in SEA who was recruiting for TIP.
• The PRC halted the flow of refugees by late 2014, but there were still leaks.
• In August 2015, China began implementing a policy to allow all Uyghurs whose passports had been held to freely get them back.
  • [e_c] Ordered by Zhang Chunxian months before his replacement.
  • [r_e] Many Uyghurs left the country legally, mostly traveling to Turkey.
    • [ q ] Much more than came through SEA.
  • [e_m] Unknown motivation, but perhaps to let dissatified Uyghurs leave on their own.
    • [e_p] Prevent violence in the future.
  • [e_m] Or was it an attempt to compile data for surveillance?
    • [ s ] Xinjiang residents had to submit extensive biometrics, like voice samples, DNA and a 3D image of themselves.
• By October 2016, passports were again gradually confiscated by police and the policy was reversed. Passport confiscation in Xinjiang 2016

TIP In Syria

Al-Qaeda and Turkey: strange bedfellows in TIP’s emergence in Syria?

• Assistance and perhaps manipulation by Al-Qaeda and Turkey probably contributed to TIP’s emergence in Syria.
  • TIP in Waziristan gained recruits in 2011 and became more ideologically integrated into Al-Qaeda.
    • [e_c] Maybe, Al-Qaeda took notice of the group’s potential and took greater control.
      • [r_i] Then TIP began getting involved in Syria from 2012, when Al-Qaeda joined the civil war, when they established the Al-Nusra Front.
      • In March 2013, TIP’s magazine suggested it was already among the foreign fighters in Syria.
      • In 2014, a TIP video showed Uyghur fighters in Syria.
      • In 2015, clear evidence of a large TIP fighting force through videos documenting their battles near Idlib.
  • A small number has been recruited in ASEA, but most came after finding refuge in Turkey.
    • Upon arrival in Turkey, Uyghurs did not get full citizenship nor refugee status, but temporary residence permits, usually without the right to work.
      • [r_e] Uncertainty of immigration status and economic situation provided incentives to go to Syria, where they were promised housing, food, and schools for their children.
    • There were recruiters in Syria who promised the eventual plan was to wage war of liberation in East Turkestan. Activists who tried to prevent Uyghurs from going were harassed.
      • [ q ] It is unclear whether they were working for Al-Qaeda, TIP, or Turkish TIP supporters, or someone else entirely.
    • Turkey allowed Uyghurs involved with TIP to move over the Syrian border easily. (anecdotal)

Who are the Uyghur jihadists of TIP?

• The number of Uyghurs may be much larger than the number of TIP fighters.
  • [ s ] Uyghurs in Syria include substantial numbers of families.
• TIP in Syria appears more like a community than militant organization.
  • [ s ] The community of TIP appears more loosely organizaed and independent of larger jihadist groups.
  • [ s ] People travel back and forth between Uyghur community in Syria and Turkey.
  • [ s ] They have Uyghur villages in Syria, complete with schools. Little evidence the villages are under command of any group.
  • [ s ] It is not clear whether those who have joined the community or even battles consider themselves ‘members.’
• Mohanad Ali Hage (Carnegie Middle East Center) calls Uyghurs ‘a different type of jihadi’
  • They do not appear interested in ruling over civilians. Rather, they tend to settle in abandoned towns where they keep to themselves and focus on fighting Assad and co.
• TIP videos suggest children are trained in weaponry and warfare, but no evidence TIP uses child soldiers.
• Therefore, it’s easy to understand the attraction to Uyghur refugees.
• Let’s describe some different types of Uyghurs who joined TIP.
  • Those who wanted to gain combat experience to eventually liberate Xinjiang from China.
    • Generally in their 20s/30s
    • Grown up in rural areas where they were under suspicion of being potential terrorists most of their life.
    • Some spent time in prison due to religious observation.
    • All of them left China due to intense pressure they felt.
    • Held intense animosity towards the Chinese state.
    • Had no real interest in global jihad.
    • All of them eventually returned to Turkey.
      • [r_i] They had becmoe disenchanted with fighting somebody else’s war.
  • Those who had come for economic reasons.
    • Especially those who came via Southeast Asia.
      • [e_c] Impoverished upon arrival.
        • [e_c] They had given all their money to traffickers.
        • [e_c] Little to no assitance by Turkey
    • They were promised everything in Syria, but must fight a war for it.
    • Some of them likely became true believers in global jihadism.
      • They stayed in Syria.
      • Now dedicated to the idea of fighting not only for East Turkestan, but for Islam.
• TIP is the most obvious manifestation of China’s self-fulfilling prophecy of Uyghur jihadism.
  • [ s ] One Uyghur noted in an interview:

    Why does the Turkistan Islamic Party exist? [it] profited from the Chinese oppression of our homeland; without that, it would not exist; China itself made the Turkistan Islamic Party.

  • The Uyghurs with TIP in Syria were not influenced by Xinjiang salafi terrorists

    • They are not the product of
      • a cohesive history of Uyghur terrorist groups
      • or Salafist movement inside Xinjiang
    • they are
      • refugees from China’s war on terror.
      • Driven to fight in a foreign war far away from Xinjiang
      • either
        • in the hope of one day using their experience to fight China
        • or as a means of survival and a sense of belonging

    Link to original

The Gathering Storm

• By 2016, there was a gathering storm of factors leading to the policies starting in 2017. TIP in Syria was only one of them.
• The cultural genocide that would begin in 2017
  • Purpose: To settle and colonie the Uyghur homeland and make it an integral part of the PRC.
  • Justification: The narrative of the ‘terrorist threat’ posed by Uyghurs.
    • This narrative was used to dismiss the core causes of violent resistance to colonization and related aggressive assimilation practices measures in rural Uyghur communities since 2011.
    • It was also used to justify the violent repression of resistance.
      • Result: A self-perpetuating cycle of violence.
  • Biopolitical understanding of a ‘terrorist threat’ as a contagion allowed the state to target all Uyghurs, and eventually Uyghur identity itself.
  • Robust TIP army would serve to
    • further justify the PRC’s genocidal strategies.
    • deflect international criticism
    • win support among Chinese citizens and government officials.
      • Many chinese citizens and state bureaucrats believe this group is
        • an existential threat
        • responsible for violent incidents in Xinjiang.
      • But the higher echelons are probably aware of the minor to non-existent threat.

Next: TWoU.Ch6.Cultural genocide, 2017–2020

Link to original

TWoU.Ch6.Cultural genocide, 2017–2020

Previous: TWoU.Ch5.The self-fulfilling prophecy and the ‘People’s War on Terror,’ 2013–2016

Ch 6 Cultural genocide, 2017–2020

• The term ‘cultural genocide’ is attributed to Polish lawyer who coined the term genocide in the 1940s, Raphael Lemkin.
  • He defined the term as ‘the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group.
  • He notes that it is rarely done through the ‘immediate destruction’ of a group. (mass murder)
  • Instead, it’s almost always implemented gradually through systematic eradication of the group’s cultural distinctiveness and way of life, the ‘essential foundations of the life of national groups.’
  • The purpose involves the

    ‘disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups.’

• Instead of Lemkin’s definition of genocide, the popular view is more narrow: the mass murder of members of a nation or group to completely obliterate their gene pool.

The Origins of the Systematic Attack on Uyghur Identity

• The campaign against the Uyghur terrorist threat targeted went beyond religiosity and ‘separatism.’
  • [ s ] Take Ilham Tohti’s case for example.
• As early as 2014, plans for the genocide were set in motion.
  • [ s ] The logic for genocide was already established.
    • Carried clear biopolitical logic
      • [ s ] Evident from government documents that say “polluted by religious extremism,” “cleansed,” etc.
        • [r_i] Suggestive of a strategy requiring treatment and quarantining to ensure extremism does not spread.
  • [ s ] The procedures and techniques were already being tested
    • [ s ] Many counties in Xinjiang began establishing ‘transformation through re-education’ programs to target ‘extremists’.
      • [ q ] These were previously limited to Falun Gong, drug addicts, and hardened criminals.
      • [ q ] Throughout 2014-2015 it was in an experimental phase.
        • [ s ] Some appeared to be daytime ‘reform schools,’ others had temporary boarding, others involved longer term detention.
      • [r_e] Did not stop violence which only escalated during 2014-2015
        • [r_i] So the successes claimed by local authorities are false.
    • [ s ] China Electronic Technology Group (PRC military contractor) was already building a database of all Uyghurs to serve in a ‘preventative policing’ program. ^6njap8
      • This system would be online by 2016.
      • And legally justified by new anti-terrorism law, allowing the state greater access to personal data.
• Now it only needed the motivation for the state to finally give up on having Uyghurs voluntarily assimilate and start aggressive assimilation.

Chen The Enforcer

• Chen Quanguo became governor on 29 August 2016.
  • [e_c] His work on stabilizing Tibet made him the logical candidate.
• His arrival coincided with the 2016 Bishkek Embassy Suicide Bombing
  • Even though the false flag couldn’t be clearer, the PRC would use it to hype up the terrorist threat, blaming ETIM once again.
• This played into Chen’s hand, so he stressed ‘placing stability above all else’ and he started his term by building an unprecedented police state.
  • [ s ] In his first year, he advertised almost 100,680 security-related jobs.
    • [ q ] This is >13 times the average annual security-related recruits for 2009-2015
  • [ s ] He established estimated 7,300 ‘convenience police stations’ in urban areas based on his Tibetan model.
  • [ s ] He used the previously built database for mass social evaluation.
  • Chen would collect a lot of biometric data on every Uyghur.
    • [ s ] Byler notes this was done through ‘free health exams’ in 2016, where Uyghurs had to provide DNA, fingerprints, voice signatures, and face signatures, all of which went into the system.
    • [ s ] The sate claimed to have collected such data for 18.8/21.8 million Xinjiang citizens.
    • [ q ] The new counterterrorism law already allowed the state to access bank and social media accounts, work and travel history.
  • [ s ] New internet regulations by December 2016.
    • [e_p] To legally monitor all content posted by Uyghurs and mine for ideological inclinations.
  • [ s ] VPNs were criminalized, calling them “terrorism software.”^[https://globalvoices.org/2016/10/26/leaked-xinjiang-police-report-describes-circumvention-tools-as-terrorist-software/]
• Integrated Joint Operations Platform is the official name of this big data surveillance and profiling program.
• IJOP took every opportunity to collect data about Uyghurs
  • [ s ] Cadres regularly visited Uyghur homes and asked a lot of questions to household members.
  • [ s ] Detailed questionnaires for Uyghurs regarding religious observation, daily habits etc.
• IJOP would be used as a tool for social control.
  • [ s ] Every Uyghur would be evaluated for ‘safeness.’
    • Those deemed normal were allowed to continue unrestricted
    • Those deemed deviant or abnormal were likely to be subjected to interrogation, detention, imprisonment or extensive political re-education.
• Still, violence was not stopped by the end of 2016.
  • In Karakash in December, a group of Uyghurs drove a truck into the yard of regional CCP HQ and blew up the truck. They were immediately killed by authorities.
  • Another alleged attack in Guma county, February 2017. Three Uyghurs entered a residential compound and killed 5 people. All three attackers were killed.

The Hammer Comes Down: 2017

• The campaign started in 2017 was a culmination of events, but the attacks in 2016 and 2017 provided a perfect justification.
  • [r_e] Following the truck bombing, 96 rural cadres were punished for not monitoring Uyghurs intensely enough.
  • [r_e] An open letter campaign began to require that high-ranking Uyghur officials issue public written statements declaring their loyalty to China.
    • [r_i] Thus, from now on, even Uyghurs who appeared loyal to the Party were liable to be infected with extremism.
  • [r_e] Military parades were held in January and February of 2017.
• In March, new deextremification regulations were approved by the regional CCP: Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on De-extremification
  • Clarification of the 2015 Counterterrorism Law and Religious Affairs Regulation
  • Fifteen different manifestations of extremist behavior, including:
    • [ q ] All forms of advice or dawah given to other Muslims.
    • [ q ] Discouraging others from marrying/living with/intermingling with other ethnicities/faiths.
    • [ q ] “Generalizing Halal,” to make its scope beyond halal food.
    • [ q ] Encouraging others to be religious.
    • [ q ] Promoting extremism through abnormal beards and specific clothing styles.
  • The regulations sought to ban anything deemed extremist (i.e. Islamic) from every sphere of life.
    • [ s ] Article 12 criminalizes any academic research on anything that could be interpreted as promoting extremification.
    • [ s ] Subsequent articles outlined how manifestations of extremism must be removed from the commercial sphere, public health, education, telecommunications, media, transportations, and any area of governance.
  • Article 14 laid the foundations for the soon to be established re-education system.
    • [e_c] It prescribes efforts to establish

      ‘educational transformation, implementing a combination of individual and group education; combining legal education and mentoring; combining ideological education, psychological counseling, behavioral corrections, and skills training; combining educational transformation and humanistic care; and strengthening the effectiveness of educational transformation.’

• March 2017 marks the beginning of the state’s year-long process of obtaining construction services
  • The earlier smaller re-education centers served as testing grounds.
    • [ s ] Zenz cites a local Party-led study for re-education work against extremism from 2014-2016, which recommended the stablishment in all prefectures and counties of ‘centralized transformation through education training centres.
• The complex of policies and measures promoting cultural destruction are
  • Re-education internment camps
  • Other forms of incarceration
  • Comprehensive system of surveillance and evaluation
  • Cleansing Xinjiang of uniquely Uyghur structural markers
    • language destruction
    • erasure of local traditions
    • razing of cultural monuments and communities
  • Establishing a distinctly Chinese landscape
    • both culturally and physically
  • Policies of forced assimilation
  • Coerced residential labor
  • Coerced miscegenation
  • [e_m] Breaking down Uyghur collective identity
• Only in september 2017 did reports get out by The Globe and Mail, HRW and RFA.
• As the existence was being revealed throughout 2018, PRC continued to deny their existence, until October 2018 when they claimed they’re ‘vocational training centers’ meant to rehabilitate alleged ‘extremists.‘

The System of Incarceration and Internment

• There is solid evidence that people are not sent merely for hitting some criteria, but that regional administrations are given quotas. (reminds me of )
  • [ s ] One county RFA spoke to in March 2018 said at least 10% of the village was sent to such camps.
• Not all camps are the same. Some are crowded while others aren’t, some are new while others repurposed, and what really matters is who is in charge of a camp.

Life in the Camps

• There is some uniformity about what internees are subjected to.
• Most accounts mention intensive Mandarin training and hours of ‘political education.’
  • This is more like brainwashing.
  • CCTV would monitor people, and if they dozed off, they would be warned via loudspeaker.
  • Students did not have a common level of Mandarin
    • [e_c] Some had better skills than the teacher while others had no experience at all
      • [r_i] This suggests these classes are less a means of instruction and more a powerful show of power of Chinese over Uyghur language.
  • Political education was more akin to chanting propaganda slogans.
• Life outside classes were even more spirit-breaking
  • Internees were forbidden to speak native language.
  • Some had to use buckets instead of toilets.
  • Minimal rations of food.
• The purpose of the classes was to erase people’s culture.
  • As a Kazakh citizen said:

    We had Chinese-language lessons. We learned the Chinese anthem and other official songs. We learned Xi Jinping’s policies. I couldn’t speak Chinese and I can’t say I learned anything from the classes. If their purpose was to teach us Chinese, why did they have so many old people in the camp? How could they learn Chinese? What I gathered from those classes was that they just wanted to erase us as a nation, erase our identity, turn us into Chinese people.^[https://believermag.com/weather-reports-voices-from-xinjiang/]

From Internment to Forced Labor

• Attempts since 2018 to link re-education camps with new centers for forced labor.
• Related to anothers state-led program to transform rural Uyghur farmers and Kazakh herders into factory laborers.^[Is this proletarianization?]
• Starting 2019, numerous capms started adding factory spaces.
• This provides propaganda cover for the PRC.

Imprisonment

• In 2017, 87000 people were convicted of crimes in Xinjiang.
  • [ q ] That is 10 times more than 2016.
• In 2018, those imprisoned were 133,198.^[https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/world/asia/xinjiang-china-uighurs-prisons.html]
• Most Uyghur cultural figures have received actual prison terms rather than re-education.
• The lines between re-education and prison interment are blurry.
• The large amount of Uyghurs who have been either interned or imprisoned is astronomical.

Surveillance Outside the Camps and the Algorithm of Extremism

• Threat of arbitrary interment or incarceration has created an environment of complete fear. Reasons for detainment in Xinjiang are vague by design.
  • [ s ] Roberts’ colleagues could not engage substantively with anybody because of self-censorship.
• The real power comes from the profiling through the IJOP system.
  • Being scanned multiple times a day at checkpoints involves having IJOP profile checked a lot of times.
    • 38 people on the Qaraqash List were identified for internment by such IJOP ‘push notifications.’
  • The constant monitoring and evaluation of Uyghurs’ lives and loyalties makes unable to talk about it with anyone.
• In rural areas, cadres were sent to do house-to-house inspections and report on families’ behavior.
  • According to a Xinjiang TV report, 24 million rural Uyghur homes between 2016-2018 were visited, conducting 33 million interviews. need_sources
  • These cadres are tasked with propaganda and data collection duties.
• The power is two-fold
  1. The fear it instills breeds distrust within the community.
  2. It makes all Uyghurs incapable of resisting CCP-led campaigns to promote assimilation.

Welcome to the Pomegranate: Erasing and Replacing Uyghur Identity

• The assimiliationist strategy has been a priority since 2014 when the state first identified the source of alleged extremism.
  • Xi Jinping said at the second Xinjiang Work Forum, to defeat ‘terrorism,’ the state had to promote intermingling of ethnic groups so they become tightly bound, like a pomegranate.
  • Until 2017, most Uyghurs resisted becoming a pomegranate seed, but resistance became futile after 2017.

Changing the Uyghur Homeland

• The PRC has long been changing the landscape of Xinjiang, but since 2017, it was not possible anymore for Uyghurs to leave their mark.
• This effort has involved removing many signs of Islamic religion.
  • Began with the removal of crescent symbols on minarets.
  • Progressed to repurposing mosques.
  • Destroying many of them.
  • Shrines of sufi saints.
    • These are very important to Uyghurs’ identity.
  • Cemeteries are uprooted
• Altering the structure of rural Uyghur villages
  • Part of a larger policy seeking to promote the ‘Three News’
    1. Advocate a new lifestyle
    2. Establish a new atmosphere
    3. Construct a new order
  • To renovate houses to remove traditional Uyghur architectural elements and replace them with allegedly modern attributes associated with Han lifestyles.
    • Ridding homes of the mahrab niche (indicates the direction of mecca)
    • Demolishing traditional supa beds
    • Replacing traditional furniture (particularly the dining table)

The Human Terrain: Changing Uyghurs

• The drive to change the human terrain is promoted in campaigns that are framed as ‘modernizing’ and promoting ‘poverty alleviation.’
• One example is the various coercive labor programs for rural Uyghurs.
• Another is the Three News campaign which seeks to condemn religion and coerced participation in events that promote Chinese culture and values.
  • Reinforced through the cadre ‘relatives.’
  • Flag-raising ceremonies, patriotic songs etc.
    • [r_e] These seem benign, but they shape a new social environment for rural Uyghurs.
  • Being asked to partake in drinking of alcohol or cigarette smoking by cadre relatives.
  • Consuming pork to honor the ‘Year of the Pig’
    • Refusal to participate could quickly be flagged as ‘extremism’
• Changing the educational system.
  • All-Chinese-language education required students to take the nationwide exam between eight grade and high school in Chinese.
    • [ q ] If they don’t pass, they go ⇒ vocational school ⇒ factory.
  • In 2017, the extra points for Uyghurs were slashed from 50 to 15. (this is not the gaokao)
  • [r_e] High schools in Xinjiang now have a higher proportion of Han students.
    • [r_e] More assimilationist experience for those who do get admitted.
  • Since those schools are in urban areas, rural Uyghurs who want to go to high school must study in boarding school environments.
• Children of interned parents face intergenerational separation.
  • [ q ] This is the hallmark of settler colonialism and cultural genocide.
  • By late February 2017, the government began construction g 4387 preschools intended to serve 562,900 new students to be done before the 2017-18 school year.
  • While the total preschool intake target in fall 2017 was 1 million, the actual number enrolled was closer to 1.4 million.^[https://www.jpolrisk.com/break-their-roots-evidence-for-chinas-parent-child-separation-campaign-in-xinjiang/#_ftn79]
    • [r_i] This increase of 50% over last year must’ve been caused by parents being interned.
• Then there’s the coerced miscegenation.
  • Incentives are provided to mixed-race couples.
    • 20-point advantage to mixed children (higher than the 15 points Uyghurs get)
  • There have been campaigns to draw Han men to the region for this purpose, showing the exotic beauty and caring nature of Uyghur women.
  • Refusing a Han man’s hand in marriage could have grave consequences.
    • Article 9.4 of the 2017 Regulations mentions interference with the intermingling of ethnicities. So if parents were to refuse to give their daughter’s hand in marriage, they could be marked up for extremism.

Break Their Roots

• Left blank

What Is The Logical Conclusion of the Uyghur Cultural Genocide

• The PRC wants, once and for all, to integrate Xinjiang into a more homogenous, Han-centric state, leaving it open for unfettered re-development.
• IMPORTANT PART. The motivation for Uyghur genocide:

  Arguably, this had been the goal of the Party in the region since at least the late 1990s, but especially since the early 2000s, and it had poured billions of dollars into the region’s development for this purpose. In the face of this development, which was accompanied by assimilationist policies, Han in-migration, and an ever-increasing securitization, many Uyghurs responded with sporadic resistance, sometimes violently. As this resistance became increasingly violent in 2013–2015, the state had decided it needed to take drastic measures to completely neutralize the population so that it could go about its work of developing the region unfettered as an integral part of China.

Link to original