TWoU - Ch4 - Colonialism meets counterterrorism 2002–2012

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• Source book chapter
• Todo need sources

Previous: TWoU - Ch3 - Myths and realities of the alleged terrorist threat associated with Uyghurs

• Initially, the recognition of ETIM as a terrorist threat had little impact on Uyghurs.
• The only thing that changed was Chinese discourse.
  • ‘Combating separatism’ became counter-terrorism.
  • ‘Exremism’ was increasingly used to signal dissent.
  • [r_e] The discoursive shift provided a convenient justification for intensifying PRC’s policies in Xinjiang.
    • [ q ] Adding vague new amendments to their criminal legal code in December 2001 adding ’terrorism crimes.’
    • [ q ] New crackdown by security organs.
      • [r_e] Leading to many arrests and imprisonment
      • [r_e] Limiting religious observation.
    • [ q ] This was similar to the 90s crackdown, but more aggressive since counterterrorism justified it.

‘ Open Up the West’ Before the 2009 Urumqi Riots: Integration or Settler Colonialism?

• State-led development in Xinjiang increased in the 90s but its benefits were geographically and ethnically unequal.
  • [ s ] Most development occured in the north, where 88% of Han lived, while ths south with 80% of all Uyghurs experienced little change.
  • [r_e] Two critical development projects were launched in the 90s
    • [e_p] To link the north and south and facilitate better regional development.
    • [ q ] The construction of the Taklamakan Desert Highway between Urumqi and souther Khotan completed in 1995, and a new rail line from Urumqi to Kashgar completed in 1999.
• Open Up the West hoped to stop Uyghurs and Tibetans calling for self-determination, by assuming that economic growth would ease ethnic tensions.
  • [e_c] Because of outdated theories of modernization from the 50s that assumed economic opportunities would pacify people.^[Related to the _The myth of progress?]
  • [ q ] However, development to resolve ethnic tension should address structural racism and ethnic organization.
    • [ q ] The campaign didn’t do that. It only focused on mega-projects related to energy, natural resource exploitation and transportation infrastructure.
• The Open Up the West projects contributed to connecting Xinjiang with other economies, but in many ways worsened tensions between Uyghurs and the state.
  • [e_c] Infracstructure further militarized the region ( XPCC).
  • [e_c] Uyghurs associated the campaign with an increase in Han migration.
    • [r_e] Which appeared to Uyghurs as an attempt to intrude their homeland instead of an attempt to help them.
  • [ q ] A small handful of Uyghurs became wealthy, especially in Urumqi. But the majority found themselves alienated.
• The displacement and cultural destruction during 2000-2010 was most felt in Kashgar, the historical center of Uyghurs’ urban culture.
  • [ s ] The heart of the city, which contained the best-preserved examples of traditional Central Asian urban residential architecture was demolished.
    • [e_p] To modernize and turn it into an international hub of commercial activity.
    • [e_m] Geographic location along routes to the west and south-west.
  • [ q ] It was not unique. Many traditional Uyghur communities were being displaced and symbols of Uyghur culture erased.

• During the early 2000s, projects to ‘integrate’ Uyghurs became more colonial.
  • [e_c] State-sponsored programs were created with the purpose of integrating Uyghurs into Han culture.
    • [r_e] These policies would drive a wedge between the youth and their parents’ generation. ^336804
    • Example: its bilingual education program. Started in 1990s, a lot of money invested into Chinese-language instruction.
      • [ s ] In 2002, Uyghur language track closed at Xinjiang University in all subjects except Uyghur language and literature.
      • [ s ] In 2004, regional government decided students at all educational levels receive mandatory instruction in Mandarin, actually a ‘covert policy of monolingual education’
        • [ s ] Most non-Han language schools were merged into Chinese-language schools.
        • [ q ] Accompanied with less publications produced in non-Chinese languages
          • [r_e] Uyghur language slowly dissapearing from media
        • [ q ] Accompanied with a trend of producing periodicals/radio/tv in non-Chinese language which were merely translations of Chinese material.
          • [r_e] Uyghur narratives being wiped out.
    • Example 2: ‘Xinjiang Class,’ boarding schools in inner for minority students that focused on political indoctrination like attempts to strip students of any religious beliefs.
    • Example 3: Sending workers to inner China to work and live in factory dormitories with Han.
      • [ q ] One of them sent young Uyghur women from rural areas in the south, to factories accompanied by language and ideological training.
        • [e_p] Perhaps hoping to increase inter-ethnic marriage.
• These programs still only affected a small percentage of Uyghurs.
  • [r_i] So these programs did not their intended purpose.

• PRC increased security everywhere to prevent disruption of Beijing Olympics 2008.
• Minister of public security announced terrorism is the greatest threat to Olympics in 2007.
  • Weird since almost no violent incidents with Uyghurs since 90s, and nothing has been heard of ETIM since then.
• Beijing’s terrorism rhetoric increased considerably in spring of 2008.
  • [e_m] The video released by Emir Abdul Haq threatening to attack the games.
  • [e_c] Foiled “terrorist attacks”
    • [ q ] 7 March 2008: authorities grounded a plane from Urumqi to Beijing where a Uyghur woman had reportedly brought gasoline canisters on board.
    • [ q ] April 2008: PRC announced it broke up 2 terrorist cells, arrested 45 Uyghurs with bomb making materials.
      • Many journalists believed this was a fabrication by the government to send a message of strength to deter any disruption.
      • Others noted the seized material couldn’t even create a car bomb.
• It increased more over the coming months due to Shanghai and Kunming bus bombings.
  • [r_e] PRC adopted extreme security measures towards Uyghurs.
    • Quarantining them from society.
      • [ s ] They were denied hotel rooms in Beijing.
      • [ s ] As many as 4k-5k were either detained or expelled from Beijing.^[https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/beijing-busy-welcoming-the-world-as-it-turns-away-its-ethnic-minorities/article656845/].
      • [ q ] It did the same to Tibetans, but not as harsh.
        • [e_c] Uyghurs were seen as potential terrorists. Not just protesters.
    • Also increased security efforts, where any Uyghur displaying open religiosity was monitored during the duration of the Olympics. #todo/need_sources
• 2008 Kashgar attack and 2008 Kucha attack occured.
  • Little is known about the motivations for these attacks.
    • [ s ] TIP did not claim responsibility.
    • [ s ] It is unclear whether they were meant to be political statements timed for the Olympics, acts of rage in response to the crackdown, or a reaction to somethingn entirely else.
    • They were more likely a response to the tight controls China put on Uyghurs.
  • [r_e] They fueled the hysteria surrounding terrorism and the Olympics.
• CCP Secretary Wang Lequan declared a ’life or death struggle’ against terrorists.
  • 200,000 public security officers and armed police were mobilized.
  • Official orders were given to puish families and neighbors of those suspected of being involved in the attacks.
    • 1,300 Uyghurs were arrested for state security crimes in 2008.
• 2009 Urumqi Riots occured.
  • [r_e] Would further fuel state and Han citizen fear of Uyghurs.
    • [r_i] This shows how Han migrants in the region viewed the local Uyghur population. Racist stereotypes.
    • [ q ] Unleashed unparalleled demonization of Uyghurs, comparable to Islamophobia in the US after 9/11. The Urumqi riots are also called ‘7/5’
  • [r_i] Shows how Uyghur resistance to Chinese rule had now become focused on the Han as a people rather than just government.
  • [r_e] The state included crackdown on religious Uyghurs ’terrorists,’ ’extremists,’
  • [r_e] The state responded by putting the entire region under lockdown for almost an entire year.
    • [ s ] Official response was to further increase security measures.
      • [ s ] Like martial law for the next year.
      • [ s ] Extensive searches for Uyghurs involved with the riots.
    • [ s ] Tight restrictions on communication.
      • [ s ] Internet locally was shut down, only restoring it step by step between December 2009 and May 2010.
      • [ s ] Text messaging were blocked until January 2010.
      • [ s ] Cell phone calls were blocked until December 2009.

• Instead of seeing the riots as a result of the pressures of development, China viewed the riots as an indication of ‘underdevelopment.’
  • [ s ] The new Party Secretary, Zhang Chunxian supported this.
• To fix this, they wanted to develop Xinjiang. Looking to settler colonization for inspiration
  • [ s ] Strategy differed little from those they’ve been pursuing since the 90s, but now it’s more overtly assimilationaist, especially in its attempt to change the landscape and demographics of the region.
• Several policies and programs started
  • The program Pairing Assistance Program (PAP) was initiated.
    • This was done not just to develop but also to reassure stability to Han migrants in the region.
      • [e_c] Han population lost conficence in local PRC administrations, so they hoped inner China administration to help them better.
  • The establishment of Special Economic Trading Areas (SETAs)
    • In Khorgus on Kazakhstan border
      • [ q ] Remote border town that could easily be built up from scratch.
    • In Kashgar near Kyrgyzstan border
      • [r_e] Densely populated Uyghur-majority city, critical to Uyghur history and identity was destroyed. ^aab1c6
        • [r_e] Uyghur inhabitants moved to concrete apartment buildings on the margins/outside the city.
          • [r_e] Caused a housing boom, majority of new apartments bought by speculators from inner China.
      • [r_e] Uyghur inhabitants physically displaced and social capital destroyed. ^0a4685
        • [e_c] Developing into SETA necessitates displacement and destruction. Old city had to be destroyed and they planned to build industrial park.
        • [e_c] Many PAP projects involved building new housing, which was provided to Uyghurs who were displaced due to development, but was not like traditional builldings, so breaks down social capital of existing neighborhoods.
      • [r_e] Uyghur elites benefited, but most wouldn’t benefit.
        • [ s ] Discriminatory hiring practices had become increasingly prevalent after 2009 riots and even state institutions.
          • [ q ] Justified as linguistically driven.
      • [r_e] Marginalization of Uyghur influence on city’s development.
        • [e_c] Chinese companies began to dominate the economy
        • [e_c] Demographic balance was shifting
        • [e_c] Uyghur cultural characteristics began to disappear
    • [r_e] More intense efforts to assimilate Uyghurs through work & education programs.
      • [ s ] ‘bilingual education’ initiative was realized
      • ~[ s ] After Urumqi riots, work programs canceled
• These were accompanied with new assimilationist trends.
  • [r_e] It was feared ethnic autonomy model for China led to the dissolution of USSR and Yugoslavia, and China should use a melting pot approach.

• Additionally, more securitization started in 2010.
  • [ q ] Especially intense in the south.
    • Monitoring and control
      • [ s ] Limits imposed on traveling outside home region.
      • [ s ] Frequent checkpoints between cities
      • [ s ] Ethnically profiled random searches
    • Controlling practice of Islam
      • [ s ] Using public institutions to
        • regulate Uyghurs’ public behavior, belief and dress.
        • Prevent Uyghur children from embracing Islam
        • Control what religious leaders tell them.
• Violent resistance broke out as a result.
  • China called them all terrorist attacks, but most were clashes between Uyghurs and law enforcement.
  • First an alleged bombing of police station in Aksu, August 2010.
  • Two incidents in Kashgar and Khotan
    • A few weeks later in Kashgar, mini-van exploded.
    • Next day, riot broke out beginning in a restaurant.
    • TIP claimed responsibility.
      • [r_e] PRC criticized Pakistan for harboring Uyghur terrorists
    • Local Uyghur said they were local people angry with the government and the Han chinese.
• Each time violence occured, heavy-handed response would make things worse.
• What the state framed as “terrorist attacks” were really just armed self-defense against police and security forces.
  • Uyghurs in Guma region were shot dead after police thought they were going to Pakistan and they took hostages.
• Violence increased in frequency in 2012.
  • February, Karghilik, Uyghur youth killed 13 Han migrant on the street for unknown reasons. Shot dead by police.
  • March, Korla, police killed 4 Uyghurs during a raid on an ‘illegal religious gathering’
  • June, Khotan, 6 Uyghurs apprehended for allegedly planning to hijack a plane.
  • June, Khotan, raid on an illegal religious school. Severe burn injuries to multiple Uyghur children.
  • August, 20 Uyghurs charged for separatism for information they posted online.
  • October, Korla, clashes between Uyghurs and Han civilians.
  • October, near Karghilik, Uyghur carried out alleged suicide attack on a border post on ‘National Day’
• The sporadic nature tells us this was not an organized insurgency but an outgrowth of growing tensions between an increasingly invasive security apparatus.
• This is a logical outcome of the security-obsessed GWOT narrative.
• One of the few attempts by Uyghurs to peacefully protest in 2009 was repressed and spiraled into violence.
• Handful of Uyghur jihadists in Waziristan sought to insert themselves into the mix but they were rather a sideshow.

Next: TWoU - Ch5 - The self-fulfilling prophecy and the People’s War on Terror 2013–2016