TWoU - Ch3 - Myths and realities of the alleged terrorist threat associated with Uyghurs

Last updated Nov 20, 2022

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• No group has ever called itself the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement or ETIM.
• But there was an existing group that had a community in Afghanistan between 1998 and 2001 with the intent of starting an insurgency inside China.
• Instead of ETIM, it called itself Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP).
  • [e_p] To honor those who battled with PRC security forces during the Baren Incident, who called their loosely organized group the same. Zäydin Yüsüp.
    • [r_e] Many people thought Hasan Makhsum’s group was the same that fought in Baren.
• Many “terorism experts” suggested this teacher was the actual founder of ETIP in the 40s or 50s.
  • [e_c] Abdulhäkim-Haji Mäkhsum taught both of them.
  • [e_c] Hasan Makhsum publicly linked his group of would-be militants with a long history of Uyghur religious nationalism.
    • This is not misleading, he was just referring to the sentiment shared by Uyghur nationalists.

The Origins of Häsän Mäkhsum’s Uyghur Islamic Nationalism and of His Community in Afghanistan

• Hasan Mahsum’s ideas were formed during the 80s and early 90s.
  • His organization was not influenced by foreign Salafi/Wahhabi thought from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan or Afghanistan.
    • [ s ] Unlike many Uyghurs who studied in Pakistan, he did not.
    • [ s ] China did not train Uyghurs to fight the Soviets.
  • Hasan Makhsum’s ideas were based on indigenous ideas about Islam.
    • [ s ] He studied Islam under Abdulhäkim-Haji Mäkhsum, whose ideas were inspired by Uyghur religious nationalism instead of Salafi thought.
      • [ s ] One of his students said in an interview with Sean Roberts: the Sheikh promoted a broad educational program, which included studying Qur’an and religious texts, but also local literary classics and the history of both Eastern Turkestan and the world.
        • [r_i] So he was likely inspired by early 20th-century anti-colonial Jadid movements, because the Jadids also promoted anti-colonial awakening grounded in an identity as modernizing Muslims.
  • The Baren Incident affected him, citing the spirit of the group led by Zäydin Yüsüp.
  • In 1997 he would preach to Uyghur exiles in Turkey and Saudi Arabia to start a guerilla war against China, without much success.
  • In early 1998 he traveled to “a land of Jihad in Central Asia”.

• Hasan Makhsum and a small group of followers went to Pakistan from Turkey in 1997.
  • [e_p] To move to Afghanistan.
    • [ q ] They were denied entry.
• With approval of Jalaluddin Haqqani, Mäkhsum and his group were able to enter Afghanistan and establish a camp
  • [ q ] But they did not have organizational relations with the Taliban.
• Most eyewitnesses say the Uyghur community led by Makhsum was largely isolated from other militant groups.
  • Abdullah Qarahaji claimed they sheltered 500 Uyghur families and trained the men in using weapons.
  • Qarahaji also said he knew no incidences where people from the camp carried out attacks in China.
    • [ s ] This did not appear to be the purpose. Hasan Makhsum himself said in a video, the purpose was to prepare Uyghurs for a coming widespread Jihad without a specific timeline.
• They did not have internet access to post propaganda, but some of its members did frequently take video footage of themselves.
  • This footage indicate the group’s inactivity and lack of resources.
    • [ s ] Footage never depicts Uyghurs in actual combat
    • [ s ] Never include more than a dozen men, armed with AK-47s.
  • Videos were likely taken only of significant events in the group’s activities.
    • [r_i] They likely depict the full extent of their capacity.
• The available evidence suggests Makhsum’s group was a failed attempt to create a militant movement, and does not support being supported by Al-Qaeda and having ties to Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
  • [ s ] Sean Robert’s research only identifies 5 men dedicated to the establishment of this community in Afghanistan:
    • Hasan Makhsum
    • Abdullah Qarahaji: Makhsum’s deputy.
    • Yüsüp Qadirkhan: Aka Sheikh Bilal.
    • Possibly Emir Abdul Haq who apparently was in charge of training newcomers.
    • A person in pakistan who arranged recruitment of newcomers. src: detaines in Guantanamo Bay.
    • [r_i] Makhsum hoped to create a militant movement, but at most was only able to start an initiative to train individual Uyghurs.
  • The failure was due to a lack of external support and also external restraints.
    • [ s ] According to Abdullah Qarahaji, the group had bad relations with Al-Qaeda.
      • [ s ] He accompanied Makhsum to a large meeting in Kandahar where bin Laden was speaking about the importance of jihad. One of the Uyghurs responded that jihad should focus on areas where religion was under attack (East Turkestan), but they found little to no support.
      • [ s ] Qarahaji also remarked that Arab groups in Afghanistan at the time looked down on Uyghurs as less orthodox Muslims.
      • [r_i] So it’s unlikely they received $300,000 from Osama bin Laden like the Chinese government suggested.
    • [ s ] According to Abdullah Qarahaji, the group also had bad relations with the Taliban, which even restricted them.
      • [ s ] Taliban and Pakistan’s ISI probably sought to use Mäkhsum as a bargaining chip in negotiations with China.
        • [ s ] Kazakhstan used Uyghur nationalists for similar purposes.
        • [ s ] The PRC sought engagement with Taliban while the rest of the world shunned their government.
          • [ s ] In 2000, the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan was the first senior official from a non-Muslim country to meet Mullah Omar. After the meeting, Taliban promised to guarantee no Uyghur groups in Afghanistan would be a threat to China.
            • [r_i] So China probably told Taliban to contain their Uyghurs.
            • [r_e] Taliban brought the members of Mäkhsum’s community to Kabul to monitor them.
              • [r_e] Any fighting force that Makhsum may have gathered and trained in 1998-1999 had been completely neutralized by now.
  • The 22 Uyghurs at Guantanamo did not even recognize Mäkhsum’s community as an actual organization.^[ Hasan Makhsum’s camp was barely functional]
    • [ q ] They described it as a group of Uyghurs brought together by difference circumstances and a shared disdain for Chinese rule.
      • [ q ] In fact, none of the detainees had ever heard of Al-Qaeda until they were sent to Guantanamo. As one detainee noted in making this point, ‘a billion Chinese enemies, that is enough for me; why would I get more enemies?’
    • [ s ] The makeshift training camp outside Jalalabad had bad living conditions.
      • There was barely any training except running in the morning and occassionaly shooting the only AK-47 of the camp.
      • One detainee said: “it was a little Uigher community where Uighers went; I do not know what you mean about the place called camp.”
  • Somewhere in 2001-2002, Hasan Makhsum and his group marched towards Pakistan. From a video, it looks as if at most 20 followers are present.
    • During this time, he called RFA to give an interview, in which he condemned the 11 September attacks and denied his group had any organizational ties or received financial support from either Taliban or Al-Qaeda.^[https://www.rfa.org/english/news/politics/85871-20020127.html]
  • What happened in Pakistan is murky.
    • [e_c] Why Makhsum was killed in 2003 is unclear.
    • Abdullah Qarahaji fled Pakistan fora enw safe haven.
  • Conclusion: It’s absurd that ETIM is classified a ’terrorist organization'
    • [ s ] No organization by this name existed
    • [ s ] This group never had close connections or funding from Taliban or Al-Qaeda.
    • [ s ] No evidence that the community (which was established in 1998) had anything to do with violent acts perpetrated by Uyghurs between 1990-2002.
      • [ s ] No evidence that it ever carried out any attacks on the PRC or anyone else.
    • [ s ] Two years after its designation, its leader was now dead and his community decimated.
    • Yet ETIM still remained on terrorism lists and Uyghurs are still feeling the consequences.

• According to TIP, they were a continuation of ETIP and the name change had taken place in 2000 before Makhsum’s death. ^a80297
  • There are no writings or recordings about this change prior to the website.
    • [ s ] Makhsum uses the name ETIP in his interview with RFA in 2002, explicitly mentioning this name was adopted in memory of Zäydin Yüsüp.
• It is likely this group was established gradually as Emir Abdul Haq asserted his leadership and began cultivating a new community.
  • [ s ] They only let their leadership known in 2008, even though they announced that Abdul Haq took over leadership immediately after Makhsum’s death.
• He aligned himself and his group more closely with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban than Hasan Makhsum.
  • [e_m] Waziristan was controlled almost completely by Al-Qaeda and TTP at the time.
  • [ s ] He might have wanted more external support for jihad than Makhsum succeeded in doing.
• By 2008, it was clear they were fully aligned with Al-Qaeda.
  • [ s ] Islamic Turkistan was published by a press usually associated with Al-Qaeda.
  • [ s ] It was reported an Al-Qaeda spox that OBL had appointed Abdul Haq as Emir of TIP and the leader of ‘Al-Qaeda in China’ (which was never heard of again after the announcement).
• Islam Awazi’s video production increased quality and quantity from 2008-2012, but that did not mean they had more Uyghur fighters.
  • [ s ] The videos - until 2011 - show few contemporary fighters. They inherited a lot of video footage from Makhsum’s community in Afghanistan.
  • [ s ] Until 2011 there were only five Uyghurs in Waziristan who appeared in these videos.
    • Emir Abdul Haq: He was the only core member of TIP who was substantively involved with Mäkhsum’s community, while the others were more engaged with the TTP.
    • Abdushukur (deputy of Emir Abdul Haq)
    • Säyfullah (TIP Commander)
    • Abdullah Mansur (Islam Awazi Producer)
    • Abduläziz (Uyghur Religious Scholar)
  • [ q ] Jacob Zenn noted that “given the prolific video production of Islam Awazi, TIP ‘appeared to be more of a propaganda group with a militant wing than a militant group with a propaganda wing.”^[Jacob Zenn, ‘The Turkistan Islamic Party in Double-Exile: Geographic and Organizational Divisions in Uighur Jihadism,’ Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, 16:17 (2018), 8–11.]
• They had two different purposes with their proapganda.
  • Getting Muslims in Xinjiang to wage jihad against the PRC.
  • Getting international jihadist networks to turn their attention towards China.
    • [ s ] Islamic Turkistan and their Arabic and Turkish videos were directed to potential funders and supporters from outside.
• By 2010, it had very little personal connection left to Makhsum.
  • [ s ] After Emir Abdul Haq died, the group was led by 2 Uyghurs who were in the Taliban and one young Salafi religious teacher.
    • [ q ] and Abdushukur became the new Emir. Abdullah Mansur became his deputy. Abdulaziz took over media production.
  • [ q ] Yet they continued to use Makhsum’s footage to evoke his role in the group’s history.
• Changes to TIP’s capacities and goals happened in 2011 making it evolve into a more mature militant organization.
  • [e_c] By 2011, TIP had become a part of the international jihad movement, but mostly inconsequential with a dozen fighters.
    • Starting in 2011, Abduläziz (Uyghur Religious Scholar) would constantly feature in TIP’s videos with many about his lectures on jihad, but also many about other ethnic groups with whom Uyghurs were fighting in Waziristan, especially Turks, Tatars and Muslims from the Caucasus.
      • [r_i] They reveal what ties the group had formed since 2003 with other non-Arab forces.
        • [ s ] Several videos about a Turkish jihadist who fought with Uyghurs
        • [ s ] A series of videos in Russian and Uyghur highlighting their collective home as Khorasan.
          • [r_i] This suggests multi-national consciousness among TIP’s Uyghurs.
    • [ q ] Despite this, TIP remained largely inspired by the Uyghur cause.
      • [ s ] Their most emotional videos were still about Xinjiang.
      • [ s ] They had two flags, the black shahada flag, and a light blue Uyghur flag with shahada.
      • [ s ] It claimed to have directly influenced the 2011 Kashgar attack.
        • [ q ] TIP did not take credit for ordering the attack but released a video celebrating the attack.
  • [e_c] New recruits joined in 2011.
    • [ s ] Videos emerged during 2011 showing new Uyghur faces.
    • [e_c] The situation in Xinjiang was increasingly oppressive, so many went to Turkey, but it’s possible some went to Waziristan.
  • [ s ] There were other indicators that TIP was evolving.
    • In Dubai, authorities had allegedly foiled a planned terrorist attack from Uyghurs with connections to ETIM/TIP.
    • In Norway, an Uyghur refugee was arrested for allegedly planning a terrorist attack for Al-Qaeda with 2 Uzbek and Kurdish men.
      • In an interview with Sean Roberts, he admitted he planned to bomb the Chinese embassy in Oslo, but denied he was working with TIP or Al-Qaeda.
• TIP until the end of 2012 was neither a powerful guerrilla warfare force nor a ’terrorist organization’
  • [ s ] It was first and foremost a shell organization whose primary activity was video production.
    • [ s ] It sought to brand itself as a jihadist group that could threaten China.
• By the end of 2012, TIP would become an entirely different organization.
  • Abdushukur, Säyfullah, and Abduläziz are killed in drone strikes.
    • The only one left from TIP’s original core group was Abdullah Mansur.
    • [r_e] This made the group increasingly anti-American as well as anti-Chinese.

• What makes a terrorist organization depends on one’s definition of terrorism.
  • Whether a group ends up on the UN’s Consolidated List depends only on their association with Al-Qaeda, Taliban, or Daesh.
    • [r_i] Therefore, ETIP should never have been listed, but TIP would qualify because of its association with Al-Qaeda and Taliban.
  • Based on The War on Uyghurs’ definition, neither Makhsum’s group nor TIP qualify.
    • [ s ] Neither has a clear record of carrying out premeditated political violence that deliberately targets civilians.
      • [ s ] Makhsum’s group never carried out any political violence at all.
      • [ q ] TIP’s case is more debatable. In 2012, it was rather a small and loosely affiliated group of Uyghurs participating in multi-national para-military groups that were fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan. ^5d3854
        • [ s ] It claimed to have carried out the Shanghai and Kunming bus bombings, but the PRC denied these claims.
        • [ s ] There were credible but questionable claims of TIP planning terrorist attacks in Dubai and Oslo, but the organization did not claim credit for either.
        • [ s ] It’s questionable whether TIP had the capacity to carry out any acts of violence prior to 2012.
        • [ s ] TIP was united due to their video production, not participation in Afghansitan conflict.
        • [ s ] TIP probably did not pose a viable security threat to the PRC.
          • There is no clear evidence they are able to carry out violence inside china, except for the 2011 Kashgar attack which involved 1 person who was trained by them a few years earlier.
          • There is no evidence their videos had a wide audience in Xinjiang, and there were very few premeditated acts of political violence by Uyghurs during GWOT’s first decade.

Next: TWoU - Ch4 - Colonialism meets counterterrorism 2002–2012